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5Energizing the Spaces of Everyday Life
Heather Chappells and Vanessa Taylor 
Introduction
New energy forms have transformed the patterns and spaces of everyday life over the 
past two centuries. These transitions from one energy pathway to another have been 
uneven, unpredictable, and often perplexing for energy users. Promises about the so-
cietal and environmental improvements that new energies would bring—such as citi-
zen empowerment, greater equity, and cleaner air—have materialized only selectively. 
No single energy pathway has proved a panacea to solve all societal problems; nor is 
one likely to emerge that will completely eradicate reliance on fossil fuels. 
The think pieces in this volume were inspired by two core questions.1 What can a 
retrospective look at how the spaces of everyday life have been energized in the past 
tell us about how to navigate the social and material uncertainties of lower carbon fu-
tures? And what can this historical focus tell us about energy users as variable agents 
of change? Together, these contributions address spatial transitions at local interfaces 
where new material energy arrangements have met very diverse forms of social life. 
All consider the role of users in energizing spaces, but they each present a unique view 
of users’ roles and relative powers as agents of change. 
The collection as a whole is designed to provoke debate about the character of energy 
spaces from a user-oriented perspective. Beyond this shared focus, there are differ-
ent understandings of user agency at the intersection of energy, society, and space. 
Energized spaces are variously conceived as sociomaterial landscapes structured by 
the regional or global politics of provision; as sites of local contestation, consumer 
resistance, and negotiation; and as culturally defined “energyscapes” where power to 
effect change evolves slowly from within communities. Energy transitions appear in 
some cases as a single fuel change for a specific group of users; in others, we see how 
multiple energy systems have coevolved to serve complex household needs. 
1 These articles arose from the Transitions in Energy Landscapes and Everyday Life in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries workshop held at the Deutsches Museum, 27–29 April 2017. The event was orga-
nized by Vanessa Taylor, Heather Chappells, and Frank Trentmann (Material Cultures of Energy Project) 
in collaboration with Christof Mauch (Rachel Carson Center) and Helmuth Trischler (Deutsches Museum). 
Sponsorship and funding for the event came from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK), Rachel 
Carson Center, and the Deutsches Museum. The editors would like to thank all the organizers and con-
tributors for helping to enrich understandings of users’ experiences of energy transitions. We would also 
like to thank the editorial team at RCC Perspectives, especially Katie Ritson and Samantha Rothbart.
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The articles in this volume offer important insights into the spatial, material, and social 
dimensions of transition that promise to enrich our understanding of how everyday 
environments came to be energized. Attention to how the varied spatial organization 
of energy influenced transition is one shared theme for the collection. The dominant 
image of “the modern energy landscape” in the twentieth century is of large-scale 
grids with pylons and wires bringing power to the waiting urban, and later rural, 
masses. Such macroscale landscapes of energy evolution represent only one piece of 
the jigsaw. Contributors to this volume also deal with what emerging energy moder-
nity looked like off the grid and how it appeared within the micro settings of urban and 
rural life. Some of the spaces featured are by now familiar research settings for the ex-
ploration of energy transitions—including niche eco-communities (Strauss and Egg-
leston), climatically sensitive buildings (Barber), cities or rural communities (Melsted, 
Carlson), and “the home” (Sandwell, Taylor and Chappells)—but there is still much 
to learn about how these spaces are politicized, diversified, and culturally nuanced. 
Other featured spaces—such as domestic fuel storage (Adams) or areas designated as 
“wastelands” (Baka)—are less familiar as the site of transitions but they can be pivotal 
to unlocking or blocking energy futures. 
Materiality is the second major dimension that connects all of the featured stories 
of energy evolution. As authors explore the convoluted transition pathways of wood, 
coal, gas, oil, biofuels, and electricity in the past, they bring to the fore the tangible or 
intangible qualities of these different energy sources and the ways in which they each 
distinctively define the spaces they inhabit. It matters that coal is dirty, hard to handle, 
and bulky, just as it matters that electricity is invisible, cannot be handled, and is use-
less without conversion. Means of accommodating physical properties are hardwired 
into the infrastructure of homes and communities, and they structure daily routines 
and habits. In the past, households organized their lives around the materiality of 
wood—which required sourcing, chopping, and storing—and of coal, which required 
stockpiling in advance of the cold winter months (see, for example, Sandwell, Adams). 
Fragile distribution networks and inadequate domestic storage could thwart people’s 
capacity to access energy and handle disruptions effectively. Attention to these differ-
ent material requirements, and to supporting infrastructures, has proved vital in the 
past to people’s capacity for transition. 
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Material energies have other sensory qualities that permeate local environments, com-
munity relations, and patterns of daily life. These can produce experiences that are 
positive—like the warmth and comfort of an open fire—or negative, as in the historical 
experience of noisy wind turbines or noxious air pollution.2 Such sensory dimensions 
are in the foreground of Jennifer Carlson’s account of contemporary energy transi-
tions in rural Germany. Intensified biogas production to support the country’s Ener-
giewende (renewable energy turn) intrudes upon the lives of rural inhabitants through 
an overwhelming stench of slurry, while simultaneously resurrecting old frictions be-
tween social classes. Materiality, and its sensory manifestation within communities, is 
central to forging positive social attachments to energy but it can also provoke reac-
tions and resistance that are rooted in the past. 
Shifting environmental sensibilities have influenced the ways in which people perceive 
the materiality of different energies over time, but they have rarely been considered 
in isolation from social and political concerns. Anthracite coal was valued in the late 
nineteenth century, as Sean Adams shows, both for its high carbon content and its lack 
of impurities, producing intense heat with little soot or smoke pollution. But its suc-
cessful penetration of North American energy markets was also its weakness as cities 
came to a standstill during regular strikes, prompting calls for transition to alternatives 
such as gas and electricity. Odinn Melsted offers a different perspective on how en-
vironmental concerns have been constructed around material qualities, showing how 
coal was “rebranded” from an essential household resource to a problem. In order to 
convince domestic consumers to embrace a “clean” geothermal future in 1930s Reyk-
javík, coal first needed to be discredited as “dirty.” Competition between fuels charac-
terized some transitions but others supported complementarity, with a range of energy 
options meeting different local or household needs. The balance between single- or 
multi-fuel arrangements has been shaped partly by users’ cultural preferences, partly 
by local resource availabilities, or by wider political ambitions. And optionality in fuel 
choice has varied greatly across energy landscapes because of the social and material 
constraints of everyday life. 
In addition to the intrinsic material qualities of energy forms, associated technologies 
embody specific discourses of environmental and social resilience that can determine 
2 See also complaints about noise and wind turbines: Noise Abatement Society (UK, established 1959), 
http://noiseabatementsociety.com/campaigns/wind-turbines/, accessed 10 July, 2018.
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people’s future relationships with energy. In the context of building materials, modern 
constructions of glass and metal are characteristically environments sealed off from 
nature, requiring energy-intensive mechanical systems to make them comfortable for 
inhabitants. But Daniel Barber’s piece explores alternative visions of modernity in 
architectural projects in Brazil from the 1930s and 1940s that embraced rather than 
excluded climate. This architecture, attentive to cultural desire as well as offering 
a different kind of functionality, embodied a counter-ideology to carbon dependen-
cy. Barber urges us to think about how to make buildings exhilarating through in-
novative features—such as the “irresistible staircase”—that can prove a compelling 
material aid to sustainable habits. Elsewhere in this volume we are encouraged to 
consider what inhabitants value within domestic spaces, and how accommodating user- 
defined notions of comfort or functionality in the past has supported energy innova-
tion (Sandwell, Strauss and Eggleston, Taylor and Chappells). 
A third dimension of common interest across this collection is the social variance that 
characterized experiences of energy transitions. Modern urbanites differed greatly 
from rural farm users in how they were able to access energy and its associated tech-
nologies, as did pioneers and later adopters. But there were also deeper social de-
marcations and divisions. Several authors address these tensions, suggesting how 
unevenness in the spatial development of energy has been matched by social asymme-
tries in access to resources. Income and class have directly determined experiences 
of energy, through the ability or inability to buy fuel (as articulated in the pieces by 
Sandwell and Adams). Housing and tenure arrangements have also limited the kinds 
of energy devices and service options available to different users, as seen in our own 
contribution. Official policies, such as those tackling rural depopulation, have likewise 
influenced what and who is prioritized in energy services. Energy spaces evolve in 
the context of these differentiated societal structures and variable cultural norms that 
specify what is essential or peripheral to domestic comfort or convenience. This tends 
to produce unequal, variegated, and “hybrid” configurations of space. While there 
have been persistent calls for equalization of services and practical efforts to iron out 
differences over time, differentiation remains a normal feature of everyday energy ar-
rangements. An important question to ask when planning energy futures is whether 
entrenched structural inequalities will prevent some citizens from achieving sustain-
able living arrangements.
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Accounts of the physical realignment of space to support modern energy infrastruc-
tures are often juxtaposed with stories of power struggles between regional network 
developers and local actors. This was true of early twentieth-century energy ideals—
with disputes over hydropower development and indigenous land dispossession in 
Canada—and it continues to be a feature of evolving energyscapes. Jennifer Baka’s 
contribution explores how India’s fuelwood crisis in the 1970s was a catalyst for social 
forestry programs on newly designated “wastelands” that transformed local subsid-
ence economies. The more recent shift from biomass to biofuel production on these 
“wastelands” severs local bonds with the land and access to its fuel and food materials; 
distant urban elites form the main beneficiaries of this version of green modernity. A 
contrasting late twentieth-century development in India, the eco-enclave of Auroville, 
highlights the evolutionary character of this modern “energyscape”—not as a finished 
space but as a continually shifting canvas for new ideas and innovations. Sarah Strauss 
and Carrick Eggleston describe an organic, fluid, and experimental process of sustain-
able adaptation where community solar and wind installations have partly given way 
over time to more resilient connections, where the community now supports the devel-
opment of externally sited wind turbines feeding the regional electrical grid to reduce 
intermittency. These cases from India, along with Carlson’s experiences of transition 
in rural Germany, illustrate how different interpretations of social and environmental 
resilience generate selective improvements, with unequal benefits. 
In highlighting the spatial, material, and social dimensions that defined experiences 
of energy in the past, this collection opens up new lines of debate about the nature of 
energy transitions in the context of variable everyday lives. Importantly, the perspec-
tives combined here do not lead us to a grand narrative of unified transformation in 
homes or communities, or towards a universal ideal of modern energized life. Notably, 
transition has more commonly been a slow, laborious, and continual process than an 
abrupt change, as new energy systems have met existing sites of consumption. Ruth 
Sandwell demonstrates these temporal rhythms of transition in recounting the slow 
progression to a mineral regime in Canada, where rural people still relied heavily on 
locally available, organic energies into the 1950s. Conversely, Odinn Melsted high-
lights the ongoing effort needed to construct demand for local geothermal heating in 
order to lure people away from their dependence on imported coal. The continuous ef-
fort involved in energizing the spaces of everyday life is often overlooked when things 
appear to have temporarily stabilized—as in today’s prevalent carbon dependency and 
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the normality of connections to centralized grids. But historical hindsight offers a re-
alistic view of how change happens, and it can help explain the circumstances under 
which resistance to a promised future may surface.  
Stories of material and cultural entrenchment within energy spaces are striking here. 
Affluence and fuel availability have partly dictated the pace of energy conversions, but 
people have not automatically switched from embedded infrastructures or existing 
practices even when faced with a cleaner, cheaper, more technologically advanced or 
convenient modern alternative. Several explanations are offered for this persistence 
of older energy formations and they point to the centrality of energy users as agents 
of change. Rural users in Canada did not wholeheartedly embrace new gas or electric 
cooking appliances, largely because older stoves enabled multitasking and contribut-
ed to “all-round” value; these advantages were especially appreciated during times of 
thrift and economy. The people of Reykjavík were not easily seduced by the idea of an 
energy source literally beneath their feet, but this was not simply because of concerns 
about cost; the geothermal option also had to match coal’s quality of heat that could 
be controlled on demand. No energy future was guaranteed if it did not provide for the 
complex elements householders valued in what they already had. What we take from 
such examples is that resistance to change appears when elements of new energy-
scapes are out of sync with existing values, or when they revitalize existing tensions 
within communities. Those planning postcarbon energy landscapes should note the 
importance of such existing values, recognizing also that users have rarely all shared 
the same “sustainable” values when appraising new energy options. 
Transitions have proved enduringly uneven processes, generating “hybrid” material 
arrangements and social disparities that are seldom ironed out. There have been huge 
changes in the energized spaces of everyday life over time, of course, and this pro-
vides hope for a more sustainable future. But people’s energy needs today, geographi-
cally adapted and culturally specialized as they are, continue to be met through mul-
tiple systems, and to varying extents. In highlighting diversity in the energized spaces 
of everyday life, this collection aims to stimulate debate about what will be valued in 
the sustainable energyscapes of the future, and to put all users at the center of such 
dialogue.  
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Vanessa Taylor and Heather Chappells 
What Do Consumers in the Past Tell Us about Future Energyscapes?
As significant players in rising carbon levels, today’s domestic energy users face in-
creasing pressure to adopt more sustainable practices and technologies. This is not 
the first time people have been asked to switch energy sources, accommodate new 
technologies, or modify their behavior. Transitions from wood to coal, and later from 
solid fuels to gas and electricity, also meant changes in homes and everyday routines. 
But domestic energy transitions across the twentieth century show that consumer 
compliance with providers’ and policymakers’ visions has rarely been a smooth or 
predictable process. Here, in order to ask how consumers will feature in the evolution 
of energy futures, we review their roles in shaping transitions in the past. Offering 
insights from our historical investigation of changing material cultures of energy in 
Britain and Canada, we reflect on a central focus of this volume: the spatially differen-
tiated character of energy modernization and the role of consumer agency in forging 
new energy spaces. We consider how the past can inform current debates about the 
transition to sustainable consumption. 
“Energyscape” is used here to encapsulate shifting connections between energy con-
sumption and production activities across multiple spatial scales: from homes and 
local communities to regional and national contexts. We draw here on the meaning 
articulated by Strauss et al: that energy exists at different spatial levels, “shifting its 
cultural, social, economic, and technological values as it flows from one domain to the 
next.”1 As fluid entities across space and time, energyscapes encompass both chang-
ing expectations of energy use at a broad societal level, and shifting local geopolitical 
and cultural contexts. Developers’ visions of national or regional energy futures may 
have a strong bearing on how energyscapes evolve locally but they have rarely deter-
mined community or household practices in precise terms. Energyscapes reflect pat-
terns of consumer resistance and negotiation, as well as cooperation.
The home within changing twentieth-century energyscapes was like Dorothy’s house 
caught in the twister in The Wizard of Oz, spinning through space and time at the 
1 Sarah Strauss, Stephanie Rupp, and Thomas Love, eds., Cultures of Energy: Power, Practices, Technolo-
gies (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2013).
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mercy of complex and unpredictable forces. These forces were generated outside 
and inside the home. They involved large-scale shifts in the global politics of energy, 
changing regional fuel availabilities, and local transformations in urban, suburban, 
and rural spaces. Affecting the finer details of household energy choices were variable 
income levels, housing regulations, new housing types, generational preferences, and 
diverse land-tenure and living arrangements. Practices within the home were also 
influenced by social patterns of work, leisure, and mobility beyond its walls. 
  
To make sense of some of these complex, dynamic forces we consider three past 
patterns of household-grid interaction that typify the contested evolution of energy-
scapes. The first interaction highlights tensions between consumers as imagined in 
developers’ visions of the future and consumers’ actual behaviors as grids expanded 
across urban and rural space. Next, we reflect on the material and cultural hybridity of 
emergent domestic energy spaces that suggests persistent differentiation in users’ ex-
periences of energy over time. The third interaction is characterized by the resistance 
of energy users, who mobilized because of conflicts over tariffs, service contracts, 
quality of service, and questions of fairness perpetuated by uneven energyscapes. In 
exploring these key tensions around the household-grid interface in the past and their 
persistence in the present, we reflect on the challenges they may create in projections 
for a sustainable energy future.
Modifying Visions of Electrified Life
Electricity was often represented by early twentieth-century suppliers as a transformative, 
modernizing force that would unite society. Sebastian de Ferranti’s statement on Britain’s 
electric future was typically all encompassing: “Wherever coal, gas, or power are now 
used, everything . . . will be better done when electricity is the medium of application.”2 
Consumers were passive beneficiaries in such visions: a captive audience eagerly await-
ing the arrival of the grid and its modern conveniences (Figure 1). Behind the scenes, 
suppliers struggled to understand the behavior of their target audiences; they also strug-
gled with technical and commercial concerns about how to expand their networks and 
construct the diversified demand they needed to balance system loads. These difficul-
2 Sebastian Z. de Ferranti, “Inaugural Address,” Journal of the Institution of Electrical Engineers 46, no. 
205 (1911): 15.
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ties shaped the nature of electrical 
development. Private providers often 
chose to serve lucrative industrial 
users first, adding domestic connec-
tions only when beneficial, to supple-
ment off-peak loads. Public providers 
promised more inclusive landscapes 
of connectivity. Adam Beck, chair of 
the Hydro Electric Power Commis-
sion of Ontario (founded 1906), advo-
cated “Power for All” citizens at low 
cost in the first decade of the twenti-
eth century, but this promise was fre-
quently reinterpreted as the physical 
and economic difficulties of rural ex-
tension became evident. The equaliz-
ing public-service ethos belied great 
unevenness in grid connections. By 
1921, only half of Ontario homes had 
electric lighting, and electricity did 
not reach many urban homes until the early 1940s. Well over half of rural homes had no 
electrical services at this time.3 Customers struggled to understand the rationale behind 
this differentiation, with advocates for Ontario’s rural users often challenging the fairness 
of service extension priorities and seemingly arbitrary pricing policies that divided neigh-
boring districts.4
The envisaged mass of new consumers did not simply materialize, either in urban or 
rural settings. Many were neither convinced by an electric future nor in a position 
to choose one, with its new equipment, complex rates, often-unreliable service, and 
upheavals in everyday routines. By 1948, almost 25 percent of UK households were 
still without electricity, the majority being tenants in poor urban housing, and rural in-
3 Ruth W. Sandwell, “Pedagogies of the Unimpressed: Re-Educating Ontario Women for the Mineral Econo-
my, 1900–1940,” Ontario History 107, no. 1 (2015): 36–59.
4 The Globe (Toronto), “Advocate Flat Rate for Hydro Power in Rural Ontario,” 17 December 1926, 11; 
“Hydro Meters,” 1 March 1935, 4.
Figure 1:
Energy users were often 
portrayed as awaiting 
electrification rather than 
being actively involved 
in modernization. Virtual 
Museum Canada, 1942. 
Used with permission 
from Manitoba Electrical 
Museum Inc.
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habitants.5 Britain’s nationalized en-
ergy sector, created that year, aimed 
to smooth out spatial and social in-
equalities in grid access and servic-
es. Aided by postwar urban housing 
programs, this figure was reduced 
to less than 10 percent by 1958. But 
even within wired households, UK 
consumers proved highly selective 
in their electrical applications, frus-
trating providers’ efforts to “build 
the load.” A national survey in 1953 
found one-fifth of farmers to be us-
ing electricity only for domestic pur-
poses, despite intensive “electricity 
on the farm” campaigns designed to 
boost agricultural uses.6 
Energy users were significant in de-
fining the terms of energy use and 
were often seen as impediments to progress. Providers frequently expressed frustra-
tion with those who failed to appreciate the benefits of new services or to use appli-
ances as intended (Figure 2). “Don’t Blame the Appliance,” a 1968 article published by 
the BC Hydro Home Service Centre,7 highlighted an enduring perception of customer 
misuse, claiming that almost half of service calls could be eliminated if homemakers 
would simply follow the instruction booklet. In reality, there were many complex practi-
cal and cultural reasons why consumers did not fully embrace electric cooking, heating, 
or laundering.
5 L. Needleman, “The Demand for Domestic Appliances,” National Institute Economic Review 12, no. 1 
(November 1960): 39–40.
6 Anthony Hurd MP, “Electricity Supplies (Rural Areas),” Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th 
series, volume 516, column 1355 (19 June 1953), available at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/com-
mons/1953/jun/19/electricity-supplies-rural-areas.
7 BC Hydro Home Service Centre, “Don’t Blame the Appliance,” The Tie-In, Aug–Sept 1968, B. Millar and 
BC Hydro Home Service Centre Collection, UBC Rare and Special Collections, Vancouver.
Figure 2:
“Are you having baking 
problems . . . ten chances 
to one it is not your 
range.” BC Hydro Home 
Service Centre, pamphlet, 
ca. 1960s, Box 2 File 3, 
Beatrice Millar Home 
Economics Ephemera 
Collection, University of 
British Columbia Library, 
Rare Books and Special 
Collections. Used with 
permission from Univer-
sity of British Columbia 
Library.
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Hybrid Energyscapes across Time
A common way of looking at energy 
developments in the past was as a 
series of zero-sum conflicts between 
competing fuels resulting in a single-
source transition. The 1932 cartoon in 
Figure 3 portrays this, with its “knock-
out” fight between a gas and an elec-
tric cooker. “Needless to say, we can-
not both have the heating and cooking 
business,” claimed the Bedford gas 
company. In fact, households relying 
on a single energy source were a rarity 
for most of the twentieth century. The 
persistence of both coal and wood in 
postwar rural Canada, for instance, has 
been well documented (see Sandwell 
in this volume). Regional availability of fuels, the cost of electrical service extensions, and 
versatility of traditional appliances all influenced household energy decision making. Fuel 
substitutability and competition also lingered in Britain. Early domestic electricity was 
often used only for lighting a single room, alongside gas or oil lighting in other rooms, for 
complex reasons relating to cost, technical capacity, and preferences for comfort. Such di-
versity is captured in a 1942 depiction of the “average British household” in Figure 4, with 
heat and power matched to different practical and affective purposes, including electrical 
appliances, a gas cooker, and an open fire for relaxing after dark. Electricity’s domestic 
role expanded significantly in the postwar years, but most households remained stubborn-
ly entangled in multiple energy networks. In a 1951 social survey of British households, 66 
percent used both gas and electricity; 98 percent still used a coal fire in their living room. A 
1963 British government report on Domestic Fuel Policy noted the continued widespread 
use of solid-fuel fires and paraffin heaters, as well as electric heaters and gas fires, attrib-
uting differences in household transitions to prices, available fuels, local habits, and the 
influence of local authorities and suppliers.8
8 Leslie T. Wilkins, Domestic Utilization of Heating Appliances and Expenditures on Fuels in 1948/49, Gov-
ernment Social Survey Publications NS, 130 (c) (London: Central Office of Information, 1951); Ministry of 
Power, Domestic Fuel Supplies and the Clean Air Policy, Cmnd. 2231 (London: HMSO, 1963).
Figure 3:
A 1930s cartoon shows a 
“knock-out” fight between 
gas and electricity, with 
the cook egging on the 
traditional gas cooker. 
Government “subsidies” 
(the wire trailing from the 
electric cooker) helped 
electricity move into some 
rural areas at this time. 
Gas Progress: The Annual 
Bulletin of the Bedford 
District Gas Company 
and Co-Partners’ Journal 
1, no. 8 (Dec 1932). © 
Bedfordshire Archives & 
Records Service.
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Figure 4:
An average day in “a typi-
cal middle-class suburban 
semi-detached house in 
the south of England.” 
G. H. Davis, “Your Fuel 
Target: A Day in the Life 
of an Average Household,” 
Illustrated London News, 
2 October 1942. © Mary 
Evans Picture Library.
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Some important regional variations 
arose where fuels were not easily sub-
stituted. In such cases, complementar-
ity shaped the transition. Despite their 
misleading names, the British Columbia 
Electric Railway Company (established 
in 1897) and its successor BC Hydro 
(created 1961) saw electricity and gas 
in complementary terms, supporting 
both options for customers (Figure 5). 
Home modernization campaigns from 
the 1930s encouraged consumers in 
the main urban centers to exercise their 
preference for a gas or electric water 
heater, refrigerator, or range. As an ex-
ample of more extreme diversification, 
the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric 
Board (established in 1943) served the 
remote highlands and islands through 
diesel generation, Calor gas, and exper-
imental wind power, as well as hydro-
electricity (Figure 6). Oil and portable 
liquid petroleum gas today remain cen-
tral to the UK’s rural heating provision.
Contested Energyscapes  
Cost has always been a potential source 
of conflict and one reason for ongoing 
reliance on multiple fuels. Household-
ers who were disillusioned with the 
prices they were paying for limited 
electrical capacity sometimes returned to older energy systems. One disgruntled To-
ronto resident reverted to the coal range for the winter to avoid paying the higher ser-
Figure 5:
“Getting the most from 
your gas or electric 
range.” BC Hydro Home 
Service Centre, illustrated 
booklet, ca.1960s, Box 
2 File 3, Beatrice Mil-
lar Home Economics 
Ephemera Collection, Uni-
versity of British Columbia 
Library, Rare Books and 
Special Collections. Used 
with permission from Uni-
versity of British Columbia 
Library. 
Figure 6:
Hydro, diesel, steam, and 
(experimental) wind and 
peat electricity generation 
in the Highlands and 
Islands. North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board, 
Annual Report and State-
ment of Accounts, 1 Janu-
ary 1953 to 31 December 
1953. © SSE.
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vice cost of adding an additional electrical wire to their home.9 There were also frequent 
reports of resistance to costly centralized provision where cheap local resources were 
available. South Wales collier families who received subsidized coal frustrated electricity 
suppliers’ aims to increase household demand in the region.10 Conflicts over fair rates 
arose when urban users were asked to subsidize rural users. And people were often 
unhappy with the tariff and service differentiations they saw in their own localities. One 
urban Victoria resident complained to BC Electric in 1930 that his friend living only a 
short distance away in the city of Vancouver paid lower rates for comparable electrical 
equipment and usage.11 But these were not simply rational consumers intent on the 
best price. Perceptions of material benefit and comfort have been contradictory. In late 
1960s Britain, a Norfolk resident complained to the electricity board that after installing 
seven storage heaters, her house was still cold. But when advised of the draught from 
her “large Elizabethan type open fire place,” she chose to keep using it.12 
People’s capacity to shape their domestic energyscapes was highly variable and af-
fected by structural constraints within and beyond the home. In Britain, housing ten-
ure was particularly influential in this regard. Local councils here held much power as 
“proxy consumers” of services and appliances, being responsible for almost a third of 
homes by 1970. Gas and electricity providers competed for services and appliances in 
new public housing from the 1930s onwards in the name of council tenants’ “freedom 
to choose.”13 Residents were not entirely locked into given energy pathways, turning 
at times to collective protest. Tenants’ rent strikes show how issues such as inad-
equate heating could become politicized, but their frequent defeats also indicate the 
odds stacked against tenants with limited legal rights.14 
Even when electrified homes became normal for the majority, some struggled to get the 
service they wanted. Some consumers demanded electrical services but were held back 
9 The Globe, “Hydro Meters,” 1935.
10 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, South Wales Electricity Board, Fifth Report and Statement of 
Accounts, Including Report of Electricity Consultative Council, for the Year ended 31 March, 1953.
11 J. Forman, “Letter to A T Goward, Manager BC Electric Railway Company,” 12 February 1930, BCER 
Collection MS-0004, RBC Archives, Victoria.
12 Eastern Electricity Consultative Council, GC473/5/14: Norfolk Local Committee, 9 April 1969, Suffolk 
Record Office.
13 Frank Trentmann and Anna Carlsson-Hyslop, “The Evolution of Energy Demand in Britain: Politics, Daily 
Life and Public Housing 1920–1970,” The Historical Journal 61, no. 3 (September 2018): 1–33; Central 
Office of Information, Housing in Britain: Reference Pamphlet 41 (London: HMSO, 1970).
14 Mass Observation Archive, Ref. SxMOA1/2/1/1/F/1, “Housing Conditions and Rent Strikes, 1939–40,” The 
Keep, University of Sussex.
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by infrastructural constraints, such as the inadequacy of wiring. As late as the 1960s, 
residents in remote parts of Ontario rewired their homes in anticipation of Hydro grid 
connections, only to be told that service was not yet economically or technically feasible 
in their area. In areas that were especially slow to electrify, rural users were enrolled as 
voluntary labor to speed up connections or offset costs. Farmers in Alberta’s Rural Elec-
tricity Associations in the 1950s–60s cooperated both by helping to construct their local 
power lines and by educating their neighbors on how to live safely with electricity. Such 
experiences of becoming electrified contrast strikingly with earlier visions of consumers 
as passive recipients of convenient modern energy forms.
 
What Can the Past Tell Us about Future Energyscapes?
Returning to our image of Dorothy’s spinning house, the home—though increasingly 
grounded within large-scale integrated networks—has not really stabilized over time. 
We see a variety of household energy transitions in the twentieth century. But within 
these changing domestic energy arrangements, there are three broad, persistent pat-
terns that we believe are crucial in considering future transitions.
Firstly, totalizing visions of transformation have rarely materialized. There is no single 
model for transitions in everyday life: these evolve in myriad ways as new spatial for-
mations meet preexisting material cultures of energy. Despite convergence over time 
around electrified ways of life, households have remained entangled in multiple en-
ergy systems that have worked for them, even where these systems have not been the 
most rational solution from a provider perspective. Hybrid modes of domestic energy 
transition are normal—even crucial—in the evolution of energyscapes. This is unlikely 
to change. Emergent systems today, such as microgrids, must also intersect with ex-
isting centralized networks and other entrenched domestic arrangements that people 
may be reluctant to change. As the experience of blackouts in the past suggests, this 
hybrid complexity can often support resilience during grid disruptions.
Secondly, domestic users have co-created energy transitions—from their decisions 
about appliance purchases and fuel mixes, to complaints about service conditions, 
or direct action in the building of rural networks. Transitions are unpredictable, but it 
is certain that households will continue to modify energy policies, though on uneven 
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playing fields in terms of their agency. While domestic consumers are being asked to 
assist in developing current plans for lower carbon societies, it is not clear that the 
complexity of domestic energy behavior is fully understood. Much emphasis is placed 
on green values as a determinant of household energy demand, but not all visions for 
sustainable living or household arrangements are the same. Nor will all those with 
green values have similar access to lower-carbon lifestyles. As social equalization in 
future energy services is far from guaranteed, there is likely to be both accommoda-
tion of change in domestic provision and hardwired resistance to change.
Finally, the combination of receptivity, adaptability, and entrenched practices that 
characterizes past domestic transitions—reflecting rational decision making, affec-
tive values, and material constraints—points to an infinite variety of flexible service 
arrangements in future energyscapes. The complexity of decision making we see in 
households of the past is an important signal for policymakers and providers currently 
considering how transitions will evolve to attend to both the internal and external 
politics of household energy demand. Though electricity networks have expanded and 
connection rates soared since the mid-twentieth century, people’s experience of elec-
trified life is still highly variable. Instead of a common end point, we see ongoing nego-
tiations to mediate the gap between people’s expectations and the variable conditions 
of their energy services. This history suggests that grand transformative visions that 
ignore spatial unevenness and sociomaterial diversity will not materialize. Diversified 
energy services aligned to people’s everyday ambitions for better lives offer more re-
alistic prospects for sustainable transitions.
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Ruth W. Sandwell 
How Households Shape Energy Transitions: Canada’s Great Transformation
The crisis of climate change has prompted concerned citizens around the world to 
consider the impact of fossil fuels on the planet’s environment and on society. Many 
individuals are struggling to understand how their own personal patterns of transpor-
tation, heating, cooling, entertainment, and eating might be contributing to the crisis, 
and they worry about what changes might be required in the near future. Climate 
change is also changing the way that researchers, including those in the social sci-
ences and humanities, think about the world—past, present, and future. Following 
the pioneering work of E. A. Wrigley,1 historians worldwide are now arguing that new 
forms of energy were at the heart of the transformations associated with industrializa-
tion. Societies were previously completely reliant on the organic, and usually quite 
limited, energy available from wood, wind, water, and muscle power, sources that 
were, however, typically renewable and sustainable. With the shift to the industrial 
energy of the “mineral energy regime” of coal, oil, gas, and electricity, energy became 
massively abundant, highly potent, easily transportable, and much cheaper than ever 
before. The new energy regime transformed just about every aspect of society, eco-
nomics, and culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unfortunately, as we 
now realize, its use is unsustainable. If, as now seems possible, the twentieth century 
emerges in the historical record as the first and last Age of Abundant Energy, histori-
ans and others will be reevaluating the sustainability not only of the mineral economy, 
but of the progress and modernity ushered in by those “new” fuels. 
The concept of energy transitions has provided a way for scholars to engage intellec-
tually with the enormity of change wrought by fossil fuels. This approach does little, 
however, to explain (to scholars or anyone else) how the transition was experienced 
within the contours of everyday life. But understanding the experience of energy tran-
sitions is arguably just the kind of knowledge people need today as they contemplate 
the challenges presented by climate change, and the need to transition to a postcarbon 
future. The emphasis on experience is important, because one of the defining char-
acteristics of having cheap, convenient, and abundant energy at our fingertips is that 
1 E. A. Wrigley, The Path to Sustained Growth: England’s Transition from an Organic Economy to an Indus-
trial Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
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most of us do not actually experience energy, as such. The energy-harvesting prac-
tices that have made up so much of the social, material, and cultural fabric of human 
history—finding food and then cooking or preserving it, caring for animals, generat-
ing heat or light, making and building things, and almost all other forms of physical 
labor—are seldom initiated or enacted exclusively in local environments today. They 
have retreated into the background of modern lives in industrial society. We all eat 
food harvested from the ground, for example, but the labor (energy) involved in plant-
ing, tending, harvesting, and transporting the food—and in many cases processing, 
preserving, and even cooking it—is done elsewhere, in places and in ways that are in-
visible to us. The relationships between the energy we consume and the environments 
that support us have been obscured by technology and distance; as a result, we know 
little about where energy comes from, how it is delivered, or what the full effects of 
its extraction, processing, transportation, and consumption are. But modern urbanites 
around the world nevertheless remain deeply linked to the environment through their 
energy use, as the crisis of climate change and a host of other environmental problems 
confirm. 
To phrase this in a slightly different way, the energy a society uses significantly deter-
mines its relationship to the environment. Arguably, it will only be when people have 
a deeper understanding of the relationship between energy and society, including 
the intended and unintended consequences of each on the other, that they are going 
to be willing and able to make the society-wide changes required to address urgent 
problems of climate change and global pollution. 
A study of the household through time, I would suggest, provides a welcome window 
on people’s energy-related experiences, allowing a view of the ways in which people 
were directly, and viscerally, linked to their environments through their daily energy-
related practices in earlier times. As Elizabeth Shove has argued, the way people use 
energy is deeply entwined with social as well as material practices; understanding 
what energy is for in people’s lives tells us a lot about its uses and significance, at both 
the personal and the social level. Situating energy use firmly within the household and 
the contexts of everyday life, and “conceptualizing energy as an ingredient of specific 
social practices” sheds considerable light on what energy means, and therefore offers 
considerable insight into why people made changes to their energy-related behav-
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iors.2 This approach challenges earlier, and simpler, triumphalist narratives suggest-
ing a “natural” or painless progress to modernity. For, notwithstanding the big picture 
of the transition from the organic to the mineral regime, a close look at patterns of 
everyday energy use demonstrates that energy transitions have been highly variable, 
intermittent, overlapping and, in some cases, strongly resisted. A focus on house-
holds, therefore, moves beyond concepts of inevitable monolithic, homogeneous, and 
one-directional change. These are particularly unhelpful for people who are either try-
ing to understand energy transitions generally, or looking for examples from the past 
to illuminate the way forward into the next energy transition to sustainable energy.
Canada’s Great Energy Transition: The Big Picture
Canada is a great place to study the history of energy and everyday life. Canadians 
have long been among the highest per capita consumers of energy. On par with Ameri-
cans, they have consumed more than twice as much energy as Europeans since before 
the early nineteenth century, a trend that continues to the present. And the society-
changing shift from the organic to the mineral (or modern energy) regime occurred 
so recently that it is still within living memory for many Canadians, providing a won-
derful range of sources and perspectives about changing energy use from which the 
historian of energy and everyday life can draw. Canada’s huge energy consumption 
is generally explained by the country’s long, cold winters, low population density, the 
great distances that separate people and markets, and an abundance of organic and 
mineral energy resources that have been increasingly exploited for personal use and 
for profit. The superabundant supplies of biomass fuel (wood) and the ease with which 
wood was transported via waterways have been used to explain the slow transition to 
the mineral regime: it was only in 1906 that Canadians obtained more energy from 
fossil fuels than trees, a benchmark that England and Wales had reached by 1800, and 
the United States by the 1880s. It was not until 1955 that Canada reached the 90 per-
cent level of fossil fuel versus traditional energy use that Britain had attained by 1845.3 
2 Elizabeth Shove and Gordon Walker, “What is Energy for? Social Practice and Energy Demand,” Theory, 
Culture & Society 31 (2014): 41–58, 51.
3 Richard W. Unger and John Thistle, Energy Consumption in Canada in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Na-
poli: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 2013).
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Rural Households and the Energy Supply Problem  
Understanding the role and nature of Canadian households and the practices of every-
day life within them provides a scale of analysis that is particularly fruitful in explain-
ing Canadians’ long reliance on organic energy. Rural populations thrived in Canada 
and remained a majority of the population until the Second World War. The great dis-
tances separating individual homesteads militated, however, against the rapid spread 
of the newly emerging network services for gas or electricity, which relied on small 
distances and high population densities to be economically viable. The vast majority 
of rural Canadians never had access to gaslight, and even as late as 1941, only 20 
percent of farm homes had central grid electricity. The relative deprivation of rural 
households compared to urban homes attracted growing attention from a wide variety 
of reformers in the early twentieth century. In the 1920s and ’30s, electrical companies 
began publishing special pamphlets to encourage rural populations to “sign up for the 
hydro,” including Boosting Egg Production, and Ten Uses for Electricity on the Farm. 
Other articles championed the health and well-being that would naturally follow with 
increased electrical consumption—“Summer Showers Chase Fatigue,” “Optometrists 
Talk about Home Lighting,” and “Electricity Will Lighten Washday Work.” Others, like 
“Does Mother Do the Pumping on Your Farm?” and “Poor Mommy!” had a somewhat 
darker message directed at those who stubbornly continued to “put up with a lot of 
needless bother and inconvenience” from old-fashioned ways of working in the home, 
when the “cool, calm and collected . . . [m]odern girls don’t go in for red faces.”4
Rural Households: Understanding the Rural Energy Landscape
While it was rural deprivation—manifested most emblematically in the absence of a grid 
delivery system of electricity—that attracted the most attention from urban observers 
by the 1920s, the energy situation of rural Canadians looked a little different from the 
vantage point of rural dwellers themselves. The millions seeking independence on their 
own rural lands in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Canada were well aware that, 
even if rural households were only marginally suited for commercial agriculture and 
4 BC Electric, “Home Service News,” June 1932, October 1933. For an overview of Canada’s energy history, 
see Ruth W. Sandwell, ed., Powering Up Canada: A History of Power, Fuel and Energy from 1600 (Kings-
ton, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016).
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remained unconnected to the electri-
cal grid, the land would still provide a 
wealth of food and fuel opportunities 
to support a family: either indirectly 
through commodity sales, or directly 
through home consumption (self-pro-
visioning). A third pillar of economic 
support in rural areas was gained from 
wages: most rural men worked part of 
the year in the rural resource indus-
tries including logging and fishing, 
and in infrastructure projects includ-
ing the construction and maintenance 
of roads, power plants, transmission 
lines, and later, oilfields. Wood, wa-
terpower, and the muscle power of 
people and their animals dominated 
families’ economic support on and off 
the farm until the 1940s, when gasoline-powered tractors began to displace horses for 
the first time, and bulldozers, chain saws, and gasoline-powered engines first made their 
appearance. 
Energy practices of the organic regime can also be clearly seen inside the home. 
Throughout rural Canada (and in parts of small-town urban Canada as well), most 
women continued to grow, cook, and preserve foods that they had gathered, grown, 
or tended on their own and nearby lands, well into the 1950s. Many kept livestock and 
sold eggs, milk, and cream. Horses provided transportation; wood provided the en-
ergy needed for cooking and heating, and for washing clothes, which the wind dried. 
Women preserved food through processes like smoking, as well as heating and can-
ning; Canada’s cold climate anticipated indoor freezing technologies of the post-1930s 
era, and ice, another link to the organic economy and local environments, continued 
to be used for food preservation by urban and rural women alike throughout the 1930s 
and ’40s in many areas. Water was pumped or carried using human muscle power, as 
few rural houses had running water until the mid-twentieth century. 
Figure 1:
Mary Tidd doing laundry 
in her Ross River home. 
A woodstove, wicker 
basket, two water barrels 
and two laundry tubs 
are all visible, ca. 1930. 
Photo by C. Tidd ©. Used 
with permission from the 
Yukon Archives, Claude 
and Mary Tidd fonds, 
77/19, #8533.
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Rural Households and the Energy-Demand Problem  
Rural men and women would eventu-
ally demand the same modern ame-
nities as their urban brothers and 
sisters, but there was a long half-cen-
tury or more when demand for such 
modern innovations was as limited 
as the supply. Patterns of household 
labor, and not just distance, contin-
ued to limit the appeal of electrical 
power. While many would have wel-
comed electric lighting at a price they 
considered affordable and fair, rural 
households balked at the high-priced 
inefficiency of electricity. Electrical 
power was, however, most cost-
effective when in heavy and steady 
use, as in a factory. Most of the farm work that could be “lightened” by electricity, 
such as winnowing or grinding, was highly seasonal and relied on bursts of power for 
short durations. As well as being poorly adapted to many rural uses, where it did exist, 
rural electrical infrastructure was not only expensive but worked erratically, subject 
to frequent power failures and planned outages, often failing when it was needed the 
most. Farm men and women, like their urban counterparts, complained about the 
difficulties of retrofitting wiring into older houses, the high cost of installing the spe-
cialized wiring needed for stoves and heaters, and incomprehensible billing practices. 
All of this limited demand, providing influential vernacular counternarratives to the 
ongoing propaganda from the electrical utility companies about the benefits of rural 
electrification. For the most part, rural households continued to rely on energy carriers 
such as wood and draft animals that provided energy consistently, in ways that were 
cost-effective and which furthermore fit into familiar patterns of daily life.
Figure 2:
Two women baking 
bread in a woodstove, ca. 
1940s. Note the electric 
light in the ceiling. Many 
homes took advantage of 
electricity for lighting but 
remained committed to 
using their multifunction-
al wood stoves for heating 
and cooking. Courtesy 
of Library and Archives 
Canada/National Film 
Board of Canada fonds/
PA-108032. 
With thanks to the 
Museum of Science and 
Technology, Ottawa, 
and their Life, Love and 
Laundry Collection, which 
first brought these images 
to my attention. 
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The Hybrid Energy Transition in Rural Canada
Coal oil lamps and wood stoves are two cases in point. Coal oil (also known as kero-
sene and paraffin) was the first petroleum product to be used widely across Cana-
da. Although it was technically a “modern” fossil fuel, it was nevertheless delivered 
through the same transportation systems as people and other goods—trains, and in 
large barrels by horse and wagon—rather than through a specialized grid system. Por-
table and inexpensive, the coal oil lamp was the artificial lighting of choice in almost 
all rural homes between the 1880s and 1950s. In daily use, it closely resembled the 
familiar oil lamp, though with the advantages of being brighter and less smoky. 
Cast iron wood stoves were used by more than 80 percent of rural homes in Canada 
from their appearance in the 1880s and into the mid-twentieth century. They were cre-
ated by the new smelting, forging, and transportation methods of the mineral energy 
regime of coal and steel. Their use in most rural homes, however, relied on familiar 
patterns of household labor, where men, women, and children first needed to find and 
process the fuelwood. And unlike the electric or gas stove, which could only provide 
one function (cooking), the wood stove provided a multiplicity of functions. As Harriett 
Beecher Stowe summarized in The American Woman’s Home, read widely throughout 
Canada, with sufficient fuel the stove would “keep seventeen gallons of water hot at all 
hours, bake pies and puddings in the warm closet, heat flat-irons under the back cover, 
boil tea-kettle and one pot under the front cover, bake bread in the oven and cook a 
turkey in the tin roaster in front.”5 And in Canada, it had the advantages of keeping a 
house warmer than other sources of heat, and drying snow-coated clothing. The new 
wood stoves (which were also capable of burning coal in wood-starved areas) were 
transformed into “the first consumer durable with near-universal market penetration” 
because they were “affordable, versatile and reliable,” and in large part also because 
they fell within established practices of everyday life.6
5 Catharine Beecher and Harriett Beecher Stowe, The American Woman’s Home (New York: J.B. Ford and 
Company, 1869), 130.
6 Howell John Harris, “Conquering Winter: US Consumers and the Cast-Iron Stove,” in “Comfort in a Lower 
Carbon Society,” ed. Elizabeth Shove, Heather Chappells, Loren Lutzenhiser, and Bruce Hackett, special 
issue, Building Research and Information 36, no. 4 (2008): 337–50.
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Conclusions
The low-energy practices so characteristic of the organic regime—decentralized, non-
commodified, locally sourced, household based, and vernacular—continued to domi-
nate rural Canadians’ engagement with energy within the domestic sphere, helping to 
explain Canada’s long reliance on organic energy. New energy practices in the home 
were adopted between 1850 and 1950, and in ways that increasingly linked house-
holds with the emerging industrial energy networks of production, transportation, and 
waste. But most characteristic of the energy transitions slowly occurring in rural ar-
eas was the adoption of hybrid patterns of change, where elements of the emerging 
fossil fuel regime could coexist (sometimes for generations) with older patterns and 
technologies that resembled those of the organic energy regime, and even alongside 
growing modern specialist networks of oil and electricity. The development of these 
hybrid energy carriers is an apt reminder that while rural people lived out their lives 
within the contours of the organic economy and were frequently criticized for being 
backward or recalcitrant, they made decisions based on what worked within their 
own political economy and patterns of everyday life. A focus on the household reveals 
that Canada’s rural majority had a complex, varied, and intimate relationship with the 
world outside their door. It was a relationship forged by their reliance on the organic 
energy regime, which lasted longer than in other industrializing countries, even as 
new fuels slowly began to impact the country’s environment and society. 
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Odinn Melsted 
Who Generates Demand for Sustainable Energy Transitions? Geothermal 
Heating in Reykjavík1
Looking around Iceland’s capital today, one might think that it was only a matter of 
time before the inhabitants of Reykjavík would tap the geothermal resources under the 
city. Virtually all houses are connected to the city’s geothermal district heating util-
ity, supplying abundant hot water for residential heating, swimming pools, and snow 
melting. But Reykjavík has not always been this way. Before the geothermal utility 
was constructed between 1930 and 1944, the inhabitants relied on imported coal for 
heating, and shifting to geothermal heating was not easy. How can this sustainable 
transition be explained? Starting with a brief overview of the geothermal utility’s his-
tory, I argue that its breakthrough depended not only on the availability of sufficient 
resources and the application of suitable technologies, but also—above all—on the 
creation of a new societal demand. 
Reykjavík’s Transition
Geothermal heating started out as an experiment in the early 1930s. Several large 
public buildings, initially an elementary school, a hospital, and an indoor swimming 
pool, were supplied with hot water from local boreholes. The experiment was a suc-
cess: the water sufficed both in temperature and quantity and could be pumped into 
existing central heating systems. Given how much it cost to heat the same spaces with 
coal, the city’s geothermal investment seemed worthwhile and was extended to 50 
or so residential houses in the vicinity between 1933 and 1938. The rest of the city’s 
3,000 buildings, however, remained heated with coal.2
  
Motivated by this success, the municipal government planned a citywide geothermal 
utility. This was a massive undertaking, with the heavy infrastructure costs exceeding 
1 Odinn Melsted is the recipient of a DOC Fellowship of the Austrian Academy of the Sciences at the 
Institute of History & European Ethnology, University of Innsbruck. This publication was also aided by 
research grants of the Landsvirkjun Energy Research Fund (Orkurannsóknasjóður) and the European 
Society for Environmental History (ESEH).
2 Reykjavík Municipal Archives, Málasafn borgarstjóra 965, Report on the Laugar Utility, 16 July 1937.
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what the city government could afford. And it meant that geothermal heating would 
have to replace coal as the primary form of heating. Construction began in 1939, when 
the city partnered with a Copenhagen contractor and secured a Danish bank loan, but 
was delayed by the outbreak of the Second World War. The utility was ultimately com-
pleted in 1943–1944, years later than planned and three times over budget. With all the 
houses connected to geothermal sources, however, coal heating had been eliminated.3 
How did Reykjavík succeed in transitioning from coal to geothermal heating? The 
geographical and societal circumstances certainly helped. Reykjavík is situated atop 
an extinct volcano that still radiates heat into the bedrock, providing a relatively high 
geothermal energy potential. And, of course, Reykjavík is situated at the edge of the 
Arctic, which means there is a high demand for indoor heating. In addition, the con-
struction of the utility coincided with a period of urban growth. New public buildings 
and (public and private) housing favored innovation in the heating sector. There was 
also an increase in engineering know-how, as Icelanders trained abroad, returned, 
and became influential public and private engineers. But those were only precondi-
tions. The breakthrough in geothermal heating depended on overcoming three central 
challenges: sufficient resources had to be made available, suitable technologies had 
to be applied, and societal demand for the geothermal alternative had to be created.
Harnessing the Earth’s Power
Reykjavík is named after the steam from the hot springs at Laugarnes, which the first 
settlers saw when they entered the bay in the ninth century (Reykja- = steam/smoke, 
-vík = bay). The hot-water springs in their natural state could be used only for laundry 
and swimming. Harnessing greater quantities required drilling into the earth and tap-
ping hot water reservoirs. And because the demand for heating was highest during 
winter, the utility’s potential supply needed to be much higher than average demand. 
The early geothermal experiment of the 1930s drew water from the hot springs at 
Laugarnes. For the citywide project, the hot water needed to be transported from the 
farm of Reykir, 15 kilometers outside the city, where much more geothermal energy 
3 For an overview, see: Lýður Björnsson, Saga Hitaveitu Reykjavíkur (Reykjavík: Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, 
2007); Sveinn Þórðarson, Auður úr iðrum jarðar: saga hitaveitna og jarðhitanýtingar á Íslandi (Reykjavík: 
Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, 1998).
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could be harnessed. (Even in Iceland, geothermal energy is not always found where 
it is needed.) As with other energy carriers, transportation from the center of produc-
tion to the center of consumption made citywide geothermal heating a costly project.
The infrastructure was crucial. The geothermal utility required boreholes to tap the 
hot water, basins to collect it, pumps to regulate its flow, insulated pipelines for trans-
portation, storage tanks, an insulated grid under the surface to distribute the water, 
house connections with regulators and measuring devices, indoor central-heating sys-
tems, and a means of discharging the water into the sewage system. To build such 
a system, the engineers mainly needed to adapt existing technologies. The drilling 
technology was essentially the same as that used to search for cold water, minerals, or 
oil. The transportation technology could be borrowed from district heating systems, 
which had already been established in cities such as Copenhagen. But the technology 
needed to be adapted to cope with mineral-rich, near-boiling water. This required ex-
tensive experimentation to find suitable materials for pipes, joints, and sealing rings. 
To limit heat loss during transportation, the 15-kilometer-long pipeline was covered 
with pieces of cheap, locally available turf, while the underground pipes in the city 
were placed in a bed of cinder (porous lava rock).4
 
The technology for geothermal indoor heating was almost completely taken from cen-
tral heating. While older homes in Reykjavík still used indoor coal ovens for heating 
and cooking, new houses were equipped with updated technologies. From the 1920s, 
the city’s hydroelectric plant supplied most homes with power for lighting and cook-
ing; hydroelectric power had replaced the need for coal ovens for cooking and “town 
gas” for lighting. By the late 1930s, most houses were also equipped with water-based 
central heating systems. Instead of burning coal in the kitchen or living room, the fuel 
was stored down in the basement and shoveled into a burner to heat up water, which 
was circulated through the house’s radiators. The spread of central heating systems—to 
almost 80 percent of the houses by 1938—facilitated the transition to geothermal heat-
ing; the existing pipes could simply be connected to the hot-water grid in the street.5
4 Helgi Sigurðsson, “Hitaveita Reykjavíkur,” Tímarit VFÍ 32, no. 2 (1947): 26–39.
5 Reykjavík Municipal Archives, Málasafn borgarstjóra 965, Comment on Central Heating Systems, 16 
September 1938.
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The Creation of Demand
Recent studies in energy history, such as Christopher Jones’s Routes of Power,6 have 
shown that the creation of user demand is a key factor in transitions from one energy 
carrier to another. Actors involved in the building and operation of new energy infra-
structures cannot rely on preexisting demand but have to help create new demand. This 
was also the case in Reykjavík. The geothermal project’s success depended on prospec-
tive users for a return on investments. They needed to be willing to abandon coal and 
switch to geothermal heating.
  
Before the twentieth century, geothermal resources were little valued by Icelanders. 
While hot springs were used for bathing, laundry, and cooking, the springs also lowered 
the value of land, as they could be hazardous to people and animals and make fresh-
water unpotable.7 Perceptions changed in the early twentieth century. Icelanders first 
considered geothermal heating a feasible alternative to solid fuels in cities upon learn-
ing about the geothermal district heating utility in Boise, Idaho, in 1910. But the initial 
excitement about becoming another Boise soon faded, as the construction of a new har-
bor, a freshwater utility, as well as a hydroelectric and manufactured “town gas” plant 
were prioritized.8 Outside of Reykjavík, however, around 20 small heating systems were 
set up in the years that followed, mostly for houses close to hot springs. These pioneer-
ing projects, and the early 1930s experiments in Reykjavík, were an important factor 
in convincing people of the feasibility of geothermal heating. The first experiences in 
Reykjavík were not solely positive, however. Users complained about the price scheme, 
which required them to pay a fixed rate per month even though they used little hot water 
during the summer. They also objected to the fact that the centralized geothermal utility 
could not be controlled as coal heating could. During the coldest days of the year, the 
system repeatedly failed to provide enough hot water, and the radiators remained cold. 
With coal, on the other hand, consumers could simply burn more fuel if they wanted to 
increase the heat.9
6 Christopher Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014).
7 Árni Magnússon and Páll Vídalín, Jardabók Árna Magnússonar og Páls Vídalíns III (Copenhagen: Hið 
Íslenska fræðafjelag, 1923), 318.
8 A. G. Johnson, “Er mögulegt að hita Reykjavík upp með Laugunum?” Þjóðviljinn 24, no. 23–24 (1910): 
90–91.
9 Jón Þorkelsson, “Haglegur hitakútur,” Morgunblaðið, 22 July 1943, 6.
35Energizing the Spaces of Everyday Life
When the citywide geother-
mal utility was being planned 
during the 1930s, many of the 
inhabitants were still not fully 
convinced. They had heard us-
ers’ earlier complaints. By the 
time the project was launched 
in 1939, however, it had wide-
spread support. How was this 
demand eventually created? 
Two groups were involved in 
this transition: builders (city 
government actors and engi-
neers), who actively promoted 
geothermal heating, and users 
(the inhabitants as prospective consumers of hot water), who embraced the builders’ pro-
motions and ultimately constructed the demand. Through a broad newspaper campaign 
for geothermal heating during the late 1930s, the builders managed to communicate the 
feasibility and the advantages of geothermal heating. Yet it was not enough just to praise 
the geothermal option. Coal was more than a prehistory to geothermal heating; when 
imported coal became readily available in the early 1900s, it was considered a godsend. 
For centuries, Icelanders had struggled to heat their homes with peat, animal dung, or 
whatever bushes could be gathered on this largely deforested island. Coal was valued 
for the reliable indoor heating it provided, which created a culture of temperate comfort 
(for those who could afford it). By targeting the disadvantages of coal and systematically 
reinforcing negative views of the fuel, builders were able to brand geothermal heating as 
the better alternative. This can clearly be seen in an advertisement from 1938 (Figure 1).
 
In essence, four issues were raised to discredit coal.10 First, coal was branded as dark 
and dirty, while geothermal heating was praised as bright and clean. Reykjavík was not 
plagued by coal smoke as badly as other industrial cities, since there were no heavy 
industries and there was usually plenty of wind to circulate the air. Yet there were also 
exceptionally cold and still winter days, when the coal smoke lay over the city like a dark 
10 See also Helgi Eiríksson, “Hitaveitan,” Lífið 4, no. 1 (1939): 458–66; Árni Óla, “Hitaveita Reykjavíkur,” 
Lesbók Morgunblaðsins 23 (1936): 177–81.
Figure 1: 
Newspaper advertisement 
for the planned geother-
mal heating utility. Source: 
Icelandic National Library. 
Morgunblaðið, 30 January 
1938, 1. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/2XkuDSV.
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cloud, dimming the day and polluting the air. Coal was condemned for the soot, dust, 
and dirt it spread on the streets and inside buildings. The geothermal alternative, it was 
promised, would clean up houses, streets, and the air.
 
Second, coal was branded as unhealthy both because of the poisonous smoke it created 
when it was burned and because it cost so much to heat up homes to what were consid-
ered “healthy” room temperatures. Geothermal heating would improve public health by 
eradicating the coal smoke from the urban environment and by providing more reliable, 
regular, and above all, affordable heating, which would reduce health risks. 
Third, geothermal heating was said to bring comforts that coal simply could not offer. It 
would end the days of coal shoveling around the house and liberate housewives from this 
arduous and filthy task. Homes would be warm day and night, as people could simply 
turn on their radiators. It would even improve one’s surroundings, as excess water could 
be used to heat up sunrooms, where the inhabitants could cultivate exotic flowers and 
vegetables. And Reykjavík would become prettier: the first chimney-free city in the world. 
(The chimneys became useless and did gradually disappear from the urban scene.) 
Fourth, there was a promise of energy autarky in using domestic resources instead of 
imported fuels. This was popular following the experience of coal shortages during the 
First World War and the 1930s, when Icelanders realized how much they depended 
on fuel imports. The citywide geothermal utility was framed as a prestigious project of 
utmost national importance. Like hydropower, geothermal energy was portrayed as a 
“national” energy carrier.
 
Yet all this changed little if geothermal heating was not cheaper than coal. Price incen-
tives are often considered key drivers of energy transitions. In Reykjavík, the promise 
of affordable heating via the geothermal grid became quite popular, as the periodically 
high cost of coal during the 1930s had made heating barely affordable to many. And 
geothermal heating promised to liberate the inhabitants from their dependency on lo-
cal coal merchants. The coal merchants were despised for receiving profits from what 
inhabitants perceived to be unethical price agreements. But how was the price of hot 
water to be determined? The builders’ strategy was to link the hot water price to that of 
coal, but keep it 10–20 percent below what it would cost to heat the same spaces with 
37Energizing the Spaces of Everyday Life
coal.11 That way, geothermal heating could compete with coal and at the same time gen-
erate maximum revenue to ensure a return on investments. While this price difference 
was not as great as many users wanted, the perceived benefits of geothermal heating 
sufficed to outweigh discontent with prices. The key to popular acceptance of geother-
mal heating was the construction of user demand during the 1920s and 1930s.
Conclusion: Learning from the Past for the Future 
Though it may sound futuristic to suggest that any town on Earth could be heated (or 
cooled) with geothermal energy, it is available all around the globe. Moreover, while inten-
sity varies, it can be harnessed anywhere with today’s technology, be it by drilling for hot 
water and steam in the depths of the Earth or by transferring ground heat through heat 
pumps. In the light of current aspirations for sustainable development, geothermal energy 
has much potential as a renewable, clean, and locally available resource. Like oil and natu-
ral gas in many other cities today, coal was the incumbent heating regime that needed to 
be replaced for geothermal heating to succeed in Reykjavík. This was achieved by making 
sufficient resources available, applying adequate technologies, and creating societal de-
mand for geothermal heating by promoting it as the better and cheaper alternative.
The case of Reykjavík shows that we cannot assume that humanity will automatically 
strive towards a sustainable future. We have not always chosen the newest, most effec-
tive, or most sustainable energy options, and the availability of renewable resources such 
as geothermal energy does not predetermine local heating systems. Energy systems are 
always built into the natural environment, with the help of technology for a complex set 
of reasons. Reykjavík also shows us that consumers play a central role in energy transi-
tions. As prospective users, the city’s inhabitants were as important as the builders were. 
Even though the users’ agency might not seem obvious, it was they who had to provide 
the demand to fund the geothermal alternative. We cannot assume that if technologies 
become more efficient and cheaper, this will eventually spur demand and lead to their 
use worldwide. If today’s and tomorrow’s engineers, researchers, and policymakers wish 
to transform energy systems, they will have to put the construction of demand at the core 
of the transition. 
11 Reykjavík Municipal Archives, Málasafn borgarstjóra 965, Comment on Hot Water Prices, 8 December 
1939.
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Sean Patrick Adams  
Domestic Storage Problems and Transitions: Coal in Nineteenth-Century 
America
Nothing warms a cold, damp room 
better than anthracite coal. Be-
cause of its high carbon content 
and lack of impurities, anthracite 
or “stone” coal, as it is some-
times called, produces an intense 
heat and—as an added bonus for 
the homeowner—very little soot 
and smoke. It is no wonder that 
nineteenth-century Americans in 
growing cities came to rely on 
anthracite as an essential heating 
fuel. Nearly all of the anthracite 
coal deposits in the United States 
lay upriver from urban centers 
such as Philadelphia, and transportation firms, such as the Schuylkill Navigation Com-
pany and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, sought to grow markets for miner-
al coal there in the decades following the War of 1812. As stone coal offered more heat 
for its weight and better enabled the use of fuel-efficient stoves or fireplace grates, it 
seemed to be the best solution for the heating-fuel crises that plagued early American 
cities. Engineers, entrepreneurs, public officials, and even philanthropists enlisted in 
an effective campaign to promote mineral fuel. Philadelphia served as ground zero for 
this transformation, but eventually cities such as Boston and New York realized the 
value of anthracite. By 1860, historian Christopher Jones estimates, about 90 percent 
of homes in the American North used stoves for heating, and an overwhelming num-
ber of those stoves burned anthracite coal for heat.1 
1 Christopher Jones, Routes of Power: Energy and Modern America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 62.
Figure 1:
Map of coalfields in 
the Eastern US. The 
dense anthracite 
fields of Eastern 
Pennsylvania were 
in close proximity 
to the large cities 
of New York and 
Philadelphia. Map by 
author.
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An Uneven Transition
This transition, however, was far from instantaneous and it depended a great deal on 
the consumer’s ability to invest in it. Affluence also dictated the pace and effectiveness 
of the conversion from organic to mineral heating fuel for the home. Philadelphia’s 
households of means had the luxury of testing various systems: perhaps installing a 
fireplace grate in one room, buying a coal stove for another, while retaining a tradi-
tional fireplace for burning firewood in yet another. This “hybridization” of home heat-
ing sources was common for large urban households, many of which preferred open 
fireplaces (with their aesthetically pleasing roaring wood fires) in common rooms, 
while warming functional areas with more efficient coal stoves.2
But the vast majority of Philadelphia’s work-
ing poor could not repeat this pattern of fuel 
consumption. Comfort was not the main con-
cern; keeping warm during the winter was 
more an issue of survival for them. Whereas 
wealthy Philadelphians might measure their 
weekly consumption of heating fuel in dollars, 
one contemporary estimated that the average 
seamstress in Philadelphia budgeted only 
about 15 cents a week in 1833. More impor-
tantly, less affluent consumers often lacked 
the cash and storage space to “lay up” their 
fuel, so they tended to purchase it in small 
amounts: by the half-bushel or even less. “If 
poor people could only realize what an advantage it would be to purchase coal in 
the summer, and their summer goods in winter, availing themselves of the seasons 
when they are selling cheap,” one 1856 proscriptive short story opined, “they certainly 
would, I think, make greater efforts to do so.”3 But all the realization in the world could 
not provide space in which to store coal over a long winter season; nor could it provide 
the ready cash to purchase four or five tons of coal at one time. Both economic and 
2 Frederick M. Binder, “Anthracite Enters the American Home,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 82 (1958): 82–99.
3 Emma Carra, “Laying in the Winter’s Coal,” Ballou’s Dollar Monthly Magazine, 4 July 1956.
Figure 2:
“The Comforts of 
a Rumford Stove” 
by James Gillray 
(1800). Wealthy 
households retained 
open fireplaces like 
this Rumford Stove 
for aesthetic pur-
poses, but used coal 
furnaces and stoves 
to heat their homes 
more efficiently. 
Courtesy of the 
British Museum (CC 
BY-NC-SA 4.0).
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spatial restrictions therefore delayed the implementation of mineral fuels in all urban 
hearths, even as coal clearly represented the future of home heating by the time of the 
Civil War.4
The Challenge of Providing Heat on Demand 
Coal-storage methods in America’s anthracite-burning cities remained imperfect. 
Some urban residents dug “coal holes” in the street for storage. In 1855, however, city 
officials in Boston considered coal holes a nuisance, as they tended to collect pedestri-
ans as well as mineral fuel. An 1863 ordinance in Boston required them to be covered 
“with a ‘substantial iron plate,’” and the legislated maximum depth of 11 feet suggests 
this was no idle threat to passers-by. Other methods made coal holes look sophisticat-
ed. In 1877 New York’s Saward’s Coal Trade Journal criticized “the ordinary custom of 
dumping the coal upon the sidewalk” as a “most unhandy and unclean arrangement.”5 
In order to remedy this problem, the editors recommended that coal be delivered in 
two-hundred-pound bags (of which ten would make a ton), which they said would be 
cleaner. In London, coal was already being delivered in one-hundred-pound bags to 
poorer customers. Spatial concerns about the storage of mineral fuel reinforced the 
division between affluent and poor consumers; the former could still afford roomy coal 
cellars or coal holes in which they stored fuel, while the latter depended upon smaller 
purchases, usually secured on unfavorable terms.6
Spatial constraints frustrated the equitable use of anthracite coal in American cities. 
An 1870 study of working-class households found that an average Boston model tene-
ment house had 20 compartments for wood or coal fuel in the basement, but that most 
other buildings lacked adequate space for their renters to store heating fuel. Inspec-
tors from the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that coal was kept in 
closets, cupboards, or under the stairs—all of these locations suggest that only a small 
amount of coal could be stored. One worker told inspectors that only “one in ten can 
4 Mathew Carey, An Appeal to the Wealthy of the Land, Ladies as Well as Gentlemen, on the Character, 
Conduct, Situation, and Prospects of Those Whose Sole Dependence for Subsistence Is on the Labour of 
their Hands (Philadelphia, PA: L. Johnson, 1833); Carra, “Laying in the Winter’s Coal,” 21.
5 Saward’s Coal Trade Journal 13, no. 2, (January 1877).
6 City of Boston, Ordered That the Chief of Police Be Directed to Notify All Owners or Occupants of Coal 
Holes (Boston, MA: 1855), n.p.; City of Boston, Rules and Regulations in Relation to Coal-Holes, Vaults, 
&c. Under the Sidewalks (Boston, MA: 1863) n.p.; Saward’s Trade Journal.
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put in a winter’s [worth of] coal”7 ahead of the season. Moreover, once Boston’s harbor 
froze up, dealers demanded payment in advance. Poor consumers there bought coal 
by the “peck,” an informal measure of about 20 pounds. Unlike the more economical 
practice of purchasing coal by the ton once per season, small-scale purchase drove the 
price up for those who could least afford it. A Massachusetts survey of 1870 estimated 
that coal secured in this fashion cost about 18 dollars a ton—about a fourfold increase 
in the price charged for larger purchases. Despite moves to reform urban housing in 
postwar decades, the improvement of heating systems found only rare mention. More 
often than not, renters were left to decide whether to use a stove, grate, or fireplace, 
and where they could purchase and store their fuel. As late as 1889, Boston’s city code 
ruled that every tenement building “shall have adequate chimneys running through 
every floor, with an open fireplace or grate, or place for a stove,” along with the facili-
ties to collect noncombustible waste.8
As has always been true of heating homes 
with coal, the solution to negotiating the 
system was spatial: large stores of coal 
purchased cheaply in warm summer 
months could last throughout the winter. 
This might seem obvious—of course the 
wealthy were able to negotiate consumer 
markets with more ease—but consider 
the ways in which home-heating markets 
were shaped by these spatial limitations. 
Although coal dealers suffered the im-
mediate brunt of consumer anger, they 
really only represented one component 
of an immensely complex energy deliv-
ery system that linked far-flung mining 
communities via rail and canal to urban distribution centers. Any disruption in this 
network could have dire effects on millions of Americans, many of whom lacked the 
capacity to store energy for more than a few days at a time. This “just in time” en-
7 Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor (Boston, MA: Wright & Potter, 1870).
8 Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics, 173, 176, 179, 246, 272; Associated Charities of Boston, Laws Apply-
ing to Tenements in the City of Boston (Boston, MA: Associated Charities of Boston, 1889), 9.
Figure 3:
Affluent households 
could lay in a sea-
son’s supply of coal 
in a basement and 
then use coal hods to 
provide fuel. Poorer 
residents stored their 
fuel wherever they 
could, or used it at 
the same time as 
purchase. Source: 
Charles Barnard, 
“From Hod to Mine. 
In Seven Lifts,” 
American Homes 
Magazine, 1874. 
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ergy flow kept wholesale prices low and discouraged oligopolistic positions in energy 
markets by creating a national system of energy production; if one coal region went 
“offline,” another could make up the difference in supply. But this network could not 
adapt when fuel consumption swelled at the same time that labor troubles simulta-
neously hit the bituminous and anthracite fields. Pennsylvania alone witnessed more 
than eight hundred strikes in its coal fields from 1881 to 1886.9
Famines, Strikes, and Energy Flows
The rise of a particularly urban phenomenon in the era of labor unrest in the coal-
fields—the “coal famine”—reflected the vulnerabilities of this national network of fuel 
production in serving urban populations. In February 1871, a series of labor disputes 
panicked New Yorkers; 1.5 million residents had an estimated two-week supply of coal 
on hand in their city. “At the very season of the year when Winter sheds it icy coat, and 
the chill, damp winds and mists of Spring succeed—just when we need the artificial 
heat to temper the unfriendly atmosphere of wind and storm,” The New York Times 
reported, “we are threatened with this kind of famine.” When more labor troubles 
threatened the flow of coal in April 1875, panicked consumers rushed to the “bucket 
and scuttle” trade of the “small-fry groceries.” In the process, they paid outrageously 
high prices for small parcels of coal, or simply did without. These occurrences played 
out across Gilded-Age America, and although most strikes were short lived, the dread-
ful prospects of an energy crisis never quite abated.10
The problem of how to provide heat on demand was not really solved until the gradual 
implementation of electric and gas heaters over the half century following the Second 
World War. There were problems, of course, with this new system of burning fossil 
fuels for heat; but generally, the networked city of the twentieth century solved the 
nineteenth-century issue of coal storage, at least in areas where natural gas or electric-
ity could replace stoves. These networks grew in both size and scale, slowly replacing 
the need for coal cellars and regular fuel deliveries in the decades following the First 
9 Andrew Arnold, Fueling the Gilded Age: Railroads, Miners, and Disorder in the Pennsylvania Coal 
Country (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 87; Sam H. Schurr and Bruce C. Netschert, Energy 
in the American Economy, 1850–1975: An Economic Study of Its History and Prospects (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 36–37.
10 The New York Times, 25 February 1871; The New York Times, 1 May 1875.
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World War. Although early adopters of natural-gas heating drew upon local reserves, 
the completion of interstate pipelines such as the Second World War’s Big Inch and 
Little Big Inch—each stretching over one thousand miles to link the gas fields of Texas 
and Oklahoma to the East Coast—mirrored the expanded, national system of coal 
distribution, even as natural gas or heating oil offered a more cost-effective solution 
to home heating. In fact, Philadelphia, the same city that benefited the most from the 
production and consumption of anthracite coal in the nineteenth century, became 
dependent upon natural gas piped in from the American Southwest in order to heat 
its homes in the 1950s.11
~
Why is the story of nineteenth-century energy storage significant? It forces us to think 
about the wider implications of an energy transition and provides an object lesson for 
how a small-scale problem—the spatial limitations of urban housing—could create 
vulnerabilities in a national system of energy distribution. Today’s home-heating net-
works provoke different anxieties. Now, we worry more about the impacts of burning 
coal on global climate change, the environmental impact of natural-gas pipelines, and 
the continued reliance upon fossil fuels in keeping us warm during the winter. Just as 
in the original transition to mineral fuel, making the break to a new regime will prove 
difficult. In 2015, for example, Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk promoted one potential solu-
tion with a system of wall-mounted lithium-ion batteries, called the Tesla Powerwall, 
to take individual homes off the grid and allow them to be self-sufficient providers of 
energy. Like the “boosters” of anthracite coal in the Early American Republic, Musk 
engaged in some criticism of the current energy regime. “It sucks, exactly,” Musk has 
said of fossil fuel emissions and climate change. “I think we, collectively, should do 
something about this,” he added, “for us and a lot of other creatures.” Rebilling itself 
as an “energy innovation company” rather than an automotive one, Tesla hopes to 
replace the networked home with an energy-independent one.12
11 Nicholas Wainwright, History of the Philadelphia Electric Company (Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Elec-
tric Company, 1961), 320.
12 Benjamin Hulac, “Tesla‘s Elon Musk Unveils Solar Batteries for Homes and Small Businesses,” Climate-
Wire, 1 May 2015, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tesla-s-elon-musk-unveils-solar-batteries-
for-homes-and-small-businesses/.
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If the historical experience of home heating teaches us anything, though, it is that 
energy transitions among consumers is a sticky, uneven process. Cultural preferences 
for open fireplaces, imperfect knowledge about anthracite coal ignition, and early dis-
ruptions in the trade all delayed the implementation of a coal-stove regime in early 
American cities. Once anthracite was king in home-heating markets, the challenges 
of fuel storage ensured that its reign benefited only wealthy consumers. Put simply, 
the process of replacing one household technological system with another—even with 
the straightforward task of warming air—can take decades to accomplish. And once 
in place, there is no guarantee that the new system will not bring unique problems 
of its own. What will be the lithium battery’s version of ash and soot, storage space 
problems, or “coal famines”? Only time will tell. 
Even today, the difficulties of household energy transitions are apparent. A crisis in 
Australia offers an example of this, where political and economic factors have com-
plicated that nation’s plan to wean itself off coal-fired electric plants. One might think 
that this is the moment for Tesla to demonstrate the value of its battery-powered sub-
stitute. But while batteries offer a fast solution to the immediate problem, coal is still 
cheaper in Australia than either natural gas or renewable energy forms, such as wind 
or solar power. Consumer resistance to higher utility bills, as well as the politician’s 
Figure 4:
Philadelphians 
attempted to rem-
edy fuel disparities 
through charitable 
institutions. This 
frontispiece of the 
1855 Annual Report 
of the Fuel Savings 
Society highlights the 
gap in home heating 
between poor and 
affluent households. 
Courtesy of the 
Library Company of 
Philadelphia.
46 RCC Perspectives
allergic reaction to promoting them, have derailed Tesla’s plan to provoke revolution-
ary change. “Forging enough common ground with the various stakeholders will be 
the main obstacle,” columnist Clyde Russell argued of Tesla’s plan, “but more than 
anything else, Australia is showing how difficult it is to end the age of coal.” The story 
of the United States over the course of the nineteenth century demonstrates not only 
how difficult it was to usher in that age, but also the unintended consequences of its 
arrival.13
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Jennifer D. Carlson  
Renewable Energy and Class Struggles: Slurry and Stratification in
Germany’s Energy Transition
Sensing the Energiewende
“When I was a girl they didn’t use those synthetic chemicals. That’s why it doesn’t 
smell right—why it smells so strong.” Pouring us both another cup of tea, 60-year-old 
Hanne1 shook her head at the stench of fertilizer blanketing the village beyond her 
kitchen window. “It’s an outrage how they stink up the countryside with that stuff.” 
Having spent many months in Dobbe, Hanne’s village, I could also attest that I had 
never smelled anything like it in the area before. It was July 2007 and I had returned to 
the East Frisian Peninsula to research everyday life in the Energiewende, Germany’s 
renewable “energy turn,” which has transformed the Lower Saxon countryside into an 
alternative energy landscape. The Energiewende is an experiment in “energy democ-
racy”; by decentralizing the grid and incentivizing people to produce their own power 
from wind, solar rays, and biomass, the transition’s planners aimed to bring everyday 
citizens into energy governance. The East Frisian Peninsula has been home to a num-
ber of early test sites for alternative energy. By 2007, the energy transition was in full 
swing: wind turbines covered the countryside, and solar panels were beginning to 
spread across rooftops in the area. 
The pungent scent of fertilizer on the breeze was part of Germany’s biofuel boom, 
spurred by federal subsidies for biofuel crop cultivation in a series of pro-renewable 
laws passed from 1990 to 2016. Much of the land here and elsewhere in Germany was 
planted with fuel crops such as corn, rapeseed, and sugar beets as farmers shifted 
gears to make the most of the biofuel boom. Amid this Rausch or “craze” for re-
newables, ordinary statements such as Hanne’s illuminated how non-farming rural 
dwellers—that is to say, the majority of the region’s population—made sense of these 
dramatic changes.   
1 The names of individuals and my field site have been changed to preserve the anonymity of those with 
whom I worked.
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Despite Hanne’s suspicions, the substance that farmers were spreading that afternoon 
probably came from a “natural” source: liquid manure from farm animals, widely em-
braced as a more sustainable fertilizer than synthetics. The difference in scent that 
Hanne noticed was not necessarily a transformation in the fertilizer’s chemical make-
up, but rather an increase in the scale of its use. Once known for its dairy farming and 
animal husbandry, Dobbe’s farmland had metamorphosed into a bioenergy landscape, 
with intensive cultivation and increased applications of fertilizer.
 
But Hanne’s description of the stench on the breeze was no less significant for being 
incorrect. In rural northern Germany, such speculation not only informs how non-
farmers perceive the farmers in their midst; it also shapes how they imagine their own 
possibilities for taking part in infrastructure projects such as the Energiewende. As 
I explain here, northern Germans’ widespread sense that farmers control local poli-
tics—and, by extension, local energy governance—stems from historical legacies of 
stratification that are reproduced anew as landowning farmers become partners in the 
energy transition. In what follows, I unpack how real and imagined divisions between 
farmers and non-farmers take shape in everyday northern Germany, and the conse-
quences these have for energy democracy.
Figure 1:
Hanne’s house is 
surrounded on three 
sides by tracts owned 
by an absentee land-
owner and cultivated 
by tenant farmers. 
Farming intensified 
in the area during the 
last century, when 
reclamation works 
raised the low-lying 
meadowlands above 
the flood plain. When 
this photograph was 
taken (2011), crops 
planted around 
Hanne’s house in-
cluded biofuel crops 
and hay. In the early 
years of Germany’s 
Energiewende, 
generous subsidies 
for biofuel compelled 
many farmers to 
plant corn, rapeseed, 
and other crops to 
be used in biogas 
digestion, further in-
tensifying cultivation 
on former grazing 
lands. 
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Who are Germany’s Energy “Citizens”?
A trend:research study from 2013 suggests that nearly half of Germany’s renewable 
energy installations are citizen owned.2 This sounds like good news for German en-
ergy democracy, but in actuality this much-cited statistic does not qualify who counts 
as “citizens.” Are they landowners who buy wind turbines, citizens who cooperatively 
share profits from a biogas-processing plant, or single-family homeowners who install 
solar panels on their roofs? It’s difficult to gauge the Energiewende’s social impact 
because there are as many energy transitions in Germany as there are places using 
renewable energy. The transition was designed to allow communities to make use of 
resources afforded by their physical surroundings—whether hydropower, solar en-
ergy, wind, bioenergy, or some combination of these. Yet the Energiewende unfolds 
differently in different places, not simply because each landscape has unique natural 
features but also because each landscape is constituted through unique social rela-
tions. These social relations have consequences both for the people who occupy a 
given landscape, and for how nature is articulated through cultural activity and ap-
propriated for human ends. Examining the Energiewende, where participation in and 
profit from renewable energy development hinges largely on investment (of money, 
rooftops and/or land), it is necessary to examine how class distinctions shape people’s 
access to energy democracy, as well as their inclination to take part in it.
 
On the East Frisian Peninsula, for example, many people spoke of rural dwellers as 
belonging to one of two social classes: namely, farmers and non-farmers. Here farm-
ers (Bauer) are generally understood as coming from families that have long worked 
the same lands, with a more patrician status in the community where they farm. 
Those who do not farm recall the region’s historical working class, whose livelihood 
once consisted of seasonal farm labor, peat cutting in moor colonies, or fishing in 
the marshes that covered the peninsula before much of the land was raised above 
the flood plain. The words once used to describe these classes in local dialect reflect 
their hierarchical placement in rural social imaginaries: farmers were Buren, a rela-
tive of Bauer; non-farmers were Lüttje Lüü, which can be literally translated as “little 
people.” Even though these class distinctions no longer correlate to income level, they 
2 trend:research, “Definition und Marktanalyse von Bürgerenergie in Deutschland” (Lüneburg: Leuphana 
Universität, 2013), https://bit.ly/2FZ8m7c.
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continue to shape economic life in northern Germany as well as its energy transition. 
When Hanne or others refer to an abstract “they” fertilizing fuel crops on the outskirts 
of town, they invoke the figure of the Buren. When people express ugly feelings about 
the massive windfalls that farmers earn from leasing their land to the nearby wind 
park, it is this image of the farmer to which they react. And when landowning farmers 
exclusively contact other landowning farmers about investment opportunities in new 
development projects, it is this class distinction that they ultimately perpetuate. 
Inequality’s Afterlife in Citizen Energy
It may seem odd that arcane class distinctions could exert such force in contemporary 
Germany, particularly in a place so greatly altered since the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Over the century, vast areas of the East Frisian Peninsula were reclaimed from 
the North Sea coast, producing land for cultivation and development. In the 1950s, 
Volkswagen built a factory at the nearby port of Emden, one of multiple manufacturers 
now offering factory jobs and other positions to which rural dwellers could commute 
on newly paved roads. Single-family homes sprang up around the peninsula as the 
availability of jobs enabled many to stay who might otherwise have left to find work. 
And newer arrivals to the peninsula—whether from other areas of Germany, as refu-
gees from Central Europe (and, more recently, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East), or 
guest workers from Turkey—have likewise participated in the industries reshaping the 
East Frisian countryside. Because postwar generations experienced unprecedented 
levels of social mobility, many descendants of the Lüttje Lüü now earn higher incomes 
than do descendants of the Bauer. Yet despite these changes, and despite the fact that 
it had been years since many East Frisians had worked in farming, older residents 
still remembered farm labor or knew someone who worked on a farm. Hence Hanne’s 
sense that she could speak with authority about farming practices that had changed 
since her youth, and her sense that farmers and landowners belonged to the same 
social class. 
With the rise of Enercon—a multinational wind turbine manufacturer—and other al-
ternative energy firms in the area, large numbers of young adults from villages such as 
Dobbe were able to find production and tech-industry jobs closer to home rather than 
moving to larger cities to the south and east. These still-forming livelihoods attest to 
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the importance of industrial work and the knowledge economy in the Energiewende, 
now Germany’s largest postwar infrastructure project. Additionally, solar panels on 
residential rooftops show how the transition has “greened” middle-class aspiration 
since the mid-century economic boom, when single-family homeownership became 
a benchmark of the good life. The Energiewende’s effects on Germany’s non-landed 
middle class are evident, if less frequently discussed in terms of local politics.
Local understandings of farmers as elites may seem counterintuitive given that Ger-
many’s small farms have long been in crisis from falling milk prices, public health 
scares over toxins in agriculture, and the bundling of tracts for high-paying industrial 
farm leases. Renewables are often portrayed as a way for farmers to stay afloat without 
having to scale up their operations to compete in a Europeanized agricultural market. 
By installing a wind turbine, solar panels, or a biogas plant, the story goes, farmers 
can remain productive members of society. Indeed, many farmers have found these 
installations helpful in meeting costs. But not all farmers are equally able or inclined 
Figure 2:
Prior to the land 
reclamation works 
that raised this area 
in the mid-twentieth 
century, farmers 
had to drain their 
lands using small 
windmills, like the 
one pictured here (in 
2017). Farmers could 
plant only on a small 
scale, making their 
living through animal 
husbandry and grow-
ing hardy feed crops 
for livestock. After 
the land was raised, 
area landowners 
rapidly consolidated 
and cultivated it, or 
leased it for farming. 
The area became a 
test site for biofuel 
crops planted on an 
industrial scale dur-
ing the Ener-
giewende. 
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to take part in the initiatives happen-
ing in their regions. Even as many 
Germans imagine farmers owning 
the land they work, the most recent 
EU Farm Structure Survey3 reveals 
that 59.8 percent of Germany’s ag-
ricultural land is actually worked by 
tenant farmers, and that number is 
growing as small tracts of land are 
bought and bundled into leases by 
large landowners. In some cases, the 
Energiewende has posed new challenges for many tenant farmers, such as the dairy 
and sheep farmers who have lost longstanding leases to biofuel crop cultivators will-
ing to pay rent at a premium.
 
Yet, beyond a boom in residential solar panels, farmers remain the most commonly 
identified actors in the Energiewende. Germany’s biofuel economy is predicated on ag-
riculture, and the majority of its biogas plants are owned and operated by farmers using 
fuel crops and agricultural waste materials to generate thermal energy. Landowning 
farmers are also visible beneficiaries of the solar boom, with large arrays spanning their 
barns’ rooftops. In some communities, landowners from longtime farming families are 
majority shareholders in limited liability companies (in Germany, Gesellschaften mit be-
schränker Haftung, or GmbH) formed to administer wind parks. One example is Dobbe’s 
“Citizens’ Wind Park,” which is sometimes mistaken for a cooperative endeavor, though 
it is privately held. “When they first started the wind park [in 1999], the people who 
started it offered a share of the profits to anyone in the community who was willing 
to pay two thousand marks [ca. 1000 euros],” one Dobbener explained to me in 2017. 
But who knew then what it would become? Today, when new turbines are planned, he 
continued, “they’re not so forthcoming with investment opportunities.” Many residents 
learn about these installations only when requests for permits are filed, triggering the 
process by which authorities are required to notify people living within a certain radius 
of the proposed site. 
3 Eurostat, “Agricultural Census in Germany,” Eurostat Statistics Explained, last modified 28 August 2018, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agricultural_census_in_Germany#Further_Eu-
rostat_information.
Figure 3:
As farmers intensi-
fied cultivation to 
reap the rewards of 
federal incentives for 
biofuel crop produc-
tion, farmlands 
were treated with 
increased amounts 
of organic fertil-
izer—particularly 
manure and liquid 
slurry harvested 
from livestock. In 
this image (2017), 
clumps of mud and 
manure are left be-
hind on a farm road 
from a tractor trailer 
carrying fertilizer to 
a nearby farm. 
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Many communities across Germany have implemented civic power generation in 
more equitable ways, with equal opportunities for participation and shareholding. 
Today, many wind parks and biogas installations are more cooperatively owned and 
managed. But the fact that more exclusive wind parks could be billed as civic energy 
projects speaks to widespread confusion—and sometimes equivocation—as to the so-
cial sustainability of clean energy initiatives. The Bundestag worked to mitigate this in 
2006 when it changed the law to promote renewable energy cooperatives rather than 
GmbHs. But as Energiewende analysts Craig Morris and Arne Jungjohann note, “[t]he 
lack of a clear definition [of community energy] means that the German government 
cannot have a specific goal for the share of citizen ownership.”4 Amid these murky 
waters, it is necessary to sound the submerged histories of class that shape renewable 
energy development in order to better understand who is able to participate in energy 
governance and who is left on the sidelines.
4 Craig Morris and Arne Jungjohann, Energy Democracy: Germany’s Energiewende to Renewables (New 
York: Palgrave, 2016).
Figure 4:
Even as German 
policymakers move 
to curb subsidies to 
mitigate the adverse 
effects of intensive 
fuel-crop cultivation, 
as well as fluctua-
tions in bioenergy 
markets, farmers 
in many areas of 
Germany continue 
to plant crops to sell 
to biogas digesters. 
This image (2017) 
depicts a canal 
bisecting two tracts 
planted with fuel 
crops located a few 
hundred meters 
from a residential 
neighborhood. Area 
residents, aware 
that nearby farmers 
had been cited for 
dumping exces-
sive amounts of 
slurry on their lands, 
pointed to swirls of 
manure-like matter 
on the once-smooth 
surface of the 
canal—evidence that 
dangerous quantities 
of nitrates were 
seeping into area 
groundwater.
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The Force of Speculation in Germany’s Energy Future
People who are sidelined from energy governance may not care or even notice that 
they’ve been excluded from it, but they are nonetheless part of the energy develop-
ment projects taking shape in their midst. Living on the outskirts of Dobbe from 2010 
to 2011, I watched as most of its remaining dairy pastures were plowed up, planted 
with corn and then, eventually, fertilized. The smell of slurry became commonplace, 
like a climatological force to which we adapted. For the majority of villagers, there 
was no telling when exactly the farmers would fertilize their crops. But when the trac-
tor pulling the slurry drum appeared on the horizon, we sprang into action, removing 
laundry from clotheslines and summoning children to play indoors. 
Elsewhere in northern Germany, people protested against plans for local biogas plants, 
citing the ecological effects of fuel monocultures and slurry stockpiling, as well as the 
potential devaluation of their own property. In the nearby village of Holtrop, a few hun-
Figure 5:
In this part of Lower 
Saxony, popular un-
ease about industrial 
farming is voiced 
in terms of class 
resentment, refer-
ring to historical 
legacies of inequality 
between landowners 
and workers. Today, 
farmers are often 
considered to be 
the inheritors of the 
prior landowning 
class, even though 
most lease the lands 
they work, and some 
farmers are con-
tracted out by larger 
corporations. Yet 
legacies of inequality 
persist, as absentee 
landowners and 
landowning farmers 
disproportion-
ately influence local 
farming practices, 
energy governance, 
and politics. In this 
picture of an East 
Frisian churchyard 
(2007), this legacy 
of inequality takes 
on spatial form, with 
the ornate graves of 
landowning farmers 
placed above the 
flood plain, and, 
working class graves 
situated beneath 
them.
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dred concerned citizens petitioned the county to block a farmer’s permit for a biogas 
plant across the road from their neighborhood of tract homes. (After going back and 
forth in the courts, the farmer prevailed, perhaps because he made a case that biogas 
would allow him to afford to maintain his dairy farm, and that he would sell the heat 
generated at his plant to the village school at a reduced price.)5 But Dobbe’s two bio-
gas plants were located at a distance from residential neighborhoods, and Dobbeners’ 
everyday conversations never connected the cornfields to the plants. Such things were 
the business of farmers, not villagers. Villagers complained about the slurry and, like 
Hanne, speculated as to what “they” were doing, but there was no move to critique the 
cultivation in our midst, nor did anyone verbally link what was happening around us to 
the biofuel industry. While these activities affected the health of the community (and 
led to nitrate runoff in its groundwater and algal blooms in nearby lakes), Dobbeners’ 
annoyance with them failed to translate into formal calls for reform or increased rep-
resentation in energy governance. 
Reacting to biofuel’s sensory incursions, Dobbeners drew upon a broader history of 
inequality as they speculated about farmers’ activities and control of the countryside. 
Their speculations elided the complex realities that farmers continue to face, as well as 
the role that capital has played in determining which farmers have influence over the 
transition. But these speculations also point to the fact that much renewable energy 
development in Germany has relied upon capital investment promoted through exist-
ing social networks between landowners. In this way, the Energiewende has limited 
the participation of the would-be “energy citizens” it was intended to enfranchise. 
And the ways in which non-farmers link existing forms of inequality to prior forms 
of inequality communicates a sense that exclusion is part of the order of things. In 
this way, capital and quiescence conspire to discourage non-landowners from stak-
ing claims in energy governance, making landowners’ domination of development 
projects a social fact. 
As federal support for civic power generation wanes, it is even more crucial to con-
sider how energy governance intersects with localized forms of social stratification, 
and with the cultural frameworks through which these inequalities are expressed. In 
5 Daniela Schröder, “Ärger um Biogasanlage: Kalter Krieg in Ostfriesland,” Spiegel Online (Last modified 8 
January, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/aerger-um-biogasanlage-kalter-krieg-in-
ostfriesland-a-664487.html.
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2016, the Bundestag moved to end subsidies for local power generation in favor of 
offshore, corporate-owned wind parks, making it harder for citizens without start-
up capital to invest in onshore development projects. Yet the Energiewende is still 
young. Market research indicates that many Germans are interested in participating 
in community energy, particularly as volunteers. It is necessary to diversify avenues 
for citizen participation not only to generate support for new projects, but also to bring 
equity to already existing ones. Many rural dwellers who have been sidelined from 
the Energiewende have cultivated sustainable practices apart from the cutting-edge 
technology of the transition. Their perspective offers new insights into Energiewende 
democracy, as it currently exists. But more fundamentally, such a perspective reminds 
us that vibrant, vernacular forms of environmental politics arise from everyday life, 
like a blast of slurry on a breeze.
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Jennifer Baka  
Do Wastelands Exist? Perspectives on “Productive” Land Use in India’s 
Rural Energyscapes
Introduction
Since the 1970s, the Government of India (GOI) has sought to cultivate energy on so-
called “wastelands,” an official government classification for marginal or degraded 
lands. The policies enabling this strategy have framed wasteland development as a 
mechanism for addressing interlinked rural-development, energy-security, and en-
vironmental challenges. This paper evaluates two such development programs—the 
1970s Social Forestry Programme and the 2003 National Mission on Biodiesel—and 
reflects on the implications of these energy transitions for rural energy users. Each 
program presented similar optimistic visions for the potential of India’s wastelands 
to generate energy and revitalize rural communities. However, they have both largely 
failed to meet the various “improvement” goals motivating the programs. In what 
follows, I compare their objectives and argue that an incomplete understanding of 
the significance of wastelands to rural livelihoods helps to explain the adverse social 
outcomes that have resulted. Without developing a more holistic conceptualization 
of the significance of wastelands, India’s future wasteland development schemes are 
likely to continue the decades-long trend of exacerbating, rather than improving, rural 
energy security. 
Wasteland Discourses and “Improvement”
John Locke coined the term “wasteland” in the seventeenth century to refer to any 
lands not privately owned: lands that are frequently referred to as common property 
lands. Arguing that there is little incentive to maximize returns from common prop-
erty lands, Locke advocated privatizing them. Privatizing the commons, he argued, 
would improve the value of nature lying in waste.1 During India’s colonial era, the term 
“wastelands” was used in land-classification processes to refer to marginal or degrad-
1 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hollywood, FL: Simon & Brown, 2011 [1680]).
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ed lands unsuitable for agricultural production. In practice, the category forged class 
divisions between indigenous communities and colonial settlers. Indigenous people, 
who often occupied wastelands, were deemed “backward” and incapable of putting 
wastelands to productive (revenue-generating) use. As a result, the colonial govern-
ment often redistributed the lands to British settlers and others who were considered 
more capable of cultivating the lands for profit. Wasteland classification and “improve-
ment” schemes extended beyond the colonial era in India but took a distinct twist 
when they were linked to the country’s energy-security and environmental goals.
In the 1970s, the GOI initiated strategies to improve the productivity of the country’s 
natural resource base. One such strategy focused on addressing the “other energy cri-
sis” of the decade: the forecast shortage of fuelwood supplies in developing countries. 
The Social Forestry Programme was a prominent part of this strategy. It established 
fuelwood lots on wastelands throughout the country in order to provide biomass en-
ergy for rural households and to alleviate land-use pressures in India’s high-value 
forests. This strategy aimed to secure household energy supplies but also to create 
new jobs for rural communities. Although highly criticized for promoting industrial 
forestry over household fuelwood needs, the Social Forestry Programme introduced 
one tree species, Prosopis juliflora (hereafter Prosopis), that has helped alleviate rural 
fuelwood shortages in certain regions of the country. Yet, unbeknownst to policy plan-
ners, Prosopis became a menace to landowners because it rapidly spread throughout 
the dryland regions of India, becoming an invasive species. Officials began classifying 
Prosopis lands as wastelands, despite the tree’s significance to fuelwood users. 
Another shift in wasteland development policy at the turn of the twenty-first century 
responded to the interlinked crises of climate change and energy security. The GOI 
initiated a National Mission on Biodiesel (2003) in hopes of cultivating a domestic 
biofuel industry by growing Jatropha curcas (hereafter Jatropha) biofuels on waste-
lands. Jatropha is a tree capable of growing in degraded environments. The tree yields 
nonedible oilseeds that can be used to manufacture biodiesel, a substitute for diesel 
fuel. Because the tree would not, in theory, compete with food production on agricul-
tural land, the Biodiesel Mission attempted to establish Jatropha plantations on 17.4 
million hectares (mha) of wasteland throughout the country—about three percent of 
India’s total geographic area. In order to make space for Jatropha plantations, the 
government began uprooting Prosopis lands, which represented a sizeable portion of 
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the wastelands targeted for the 
Biodiesel Mission (Figure 1). 
In practice, the Social Forestry 
Programme in India and analo-
gous community forestry proj-
ects throughout the world have 
been criticized for their regres-
sive effects. Scholars have ar-
gued that conceptualizing the 
fuelwood “crisis” as nothing 
more than a supply shortage 
overlooked the broader economic and political processes facilitating deforestation. Fur-
ther, many of the tree species promoted under these projects, such as eucalyptus and 
teak, were better suited as feedstocks for emerging pulp and paper industries than as 
household fuelwood. These disconnections between policy and practice motivated com-
munity protests, including the famed Chipko movement in India, in which rural women 
created human chains around trees in protest against deforestation. The Jatropha Mis-
sion is today widely considered a failure for technological, economic, and political rea-
sons, and has been linked to public-private land grabs within the country. Making space 
for Jatropha has also exacerbated rural energy shortages, as Jatropha is not a substitute 
for Prosopis.
Wasteland Development: Getting the Numbers “Right”
Defining and classifying wastelands was a key component of India’s postcolonial de-
velopment schemes. Such definitions, however, focused on the ecological and eco-
nomic conditions of lands, rather than their social significance. In the 1980s, India ini-
tiated the Wasteland Atlas of India, a classification project that uses remote sensing to 
identify degraded lands, and categorizes wastelands by type and severity. According 
to the most recent version of the Atlas, nearly 15 percent of India’s total geographic 
area is currently classified as wasteland (47.2 mha). These definitions serve to con-
struct wastelands as empty, unused lands that are available for improvement projects. 
However, wastelands, and common property lands more generally, are often used by 
Figure 1: 
Jatropha tree 
(left) in front of 
Prosopis trees (right) 
on wastelands, 
Tamil Nadu. Photo 
by author. 
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landless communities for gathering fuelwood and fodder. These dimensions are not 
included in India’s current wasteland classifications. This is because of official as-
sumptions as to what constitutes “productive” land use and “modern” energy servic-
es. Scholars have argued that the GOI’s conceptualization of “wasteland” has become 
so malleable a term that it is difficult to discern what types of lands could be converted 
to Jatropha plantations; recent shifts in classifications, they assert, are aimed at facili-
tating land transfers to industry.2 As I have argued elsewhere, wasteland development 
acts as a metaphor for the entrenched struggle between government conceptions of 
land-use “improvement” and existing local land-use practices.3 
The Transition from Prosopis to Jatropha 
The interlinkages between the Social Forestry Programme and the National Mission 
on Biodiesel are starkly illustrated by the transition from Prosopis to Jatropha in ru-
ral India. To better examine this transition, I conducted a comparative energy-flow 
analysis of the Prosopis and Jatropha energy economies in Sattur Taluk, Tamil Nadu, 
India (Figure 2). The objective of such an analysis was to evaluate the mobilization, 
transformation, use, and disposal of energy within society.4
The energy-flow analysis revealed that the existing Prosopis economy currently pro-
vides three to 10 times more useful energy than India’s proposed Jatropha economy. 
Despite this, neither the central nor state government biofuel policies mention the 
Prosopis economy. The study also compared the types of energy services provided 
by the Prosopis and Jatropha systems in order to evaluate the distribution of costs 
and benefits resulting from India’s efforts to replace one with the other. Prosopis is 
primarily used as fuelwood by local households and small-scale industries, and as a 
feedstock for energy provision. For many decades, it was used to manufacture char-
coal but in recent years, as numerous small-scale biomass power plants have opened 
throughout Tamil Nadu, it has been used as a feedstock for electricity generation. 
2 Pere Ariza-Montobbio, Sharachchandra Lele, Giorgos Kallis, and Joan Martinez-Alier, “The Political 
Ecology of Jatropha Plantations for Biodiesel in Tamil Nadu, India,” Journal of Peasant Studies 37 (2010): 
875–97.
3 Jennifer Baka, “The Political Construction of Wasteland: Governmentality, Land Acquisition and Social 
Inequality in South India,” Development and Change 44 (2013): 409–28.
4 Jennifer Baka and Robert Bailis, “Wasteland Energy-Scapes: A Comparative Energy Flow Analysis of 
India’s Biofuel and Biomass Economies,” Ecological Economics 108 (2014): 8–17.
61Energizing the Spaces of Everyday Life
While some of the energy services provided by Prosopis are exported from Sattur, 
most of the energy is consumed locally. In contrast, Jatropha is used to manufacture 
a liquid transportation fuel, an energy service not currently provided by Prosopis. 
Although some of the by-products from the manufacture of Jatropha biofuel could, in 
theory, be used as substitutes for Prosopis, they are insuffi cient to match the quantity 
of energy that the Prosopis energy system presently provides.
Because of both the differences in the quantity of energy and incommensurate types 
of energy services provided by these two economies, replacing Prosopis with Jatropha 
in Sattur has engendered a rural energy defi cit, exacerbating rural energy poverty and 
contributing to what geographers refer to as “uneven development.” Further, landless 
rural communities are disproportionately bearing the costs of India’s efforts to develop 
an environmentally friendly domestic renewable-energy economy. The benefi ts of this 
energy economy fl ow instead to the country’s rapidly urbanizing vehicle-owning, bio-
diesel-consuming households, as well as to industrial elites who have profi ted from the 
land transfers and economic subsidies implemented by the GOI to establish Jatropha 
plantations. Lastly, the energy fl ow analysis supports environmental-justice activist 
Figure 2: 
Map showing Sattur 
Taluk, Tamil Nadu. 
Map by author.
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Vandana Shiva’s assertion that Jatropha fuels cars while impoverishing rural commu-
nities.5 Elsewhere I have termed this process “energy dispossession.”6
Hidden Livelihoods: Land Grabs and Surplus Populations 
The process of energy dispossession was also enabled by GOI efforts to privatize and 
enclose wastelands. Specifically, the GOI extended land leases, lines of credit, and sub-
sidies to biofuel companies who were willing to establish Jatropha plantations on waste-
lands. In a rush for wastelands, land brokers throughout Sattur started to amass contigu-
ous plots of wastelands in order to establish Jatropha plantations. Land grabs ensued, as 
land brokers began bribing government officials for land records rather than attempting 
to purchase these plots. Once land brokers had acquired the land, landless communities 
could no longer use it for animal grazing and fuelwood harvesting.
Further, the energy transition from Prosopis to Jatropha translated into net job losses 
in rural Sattur. Landless laborers had frequently worked on Prosopis cutting crews, 
a job that provided about nine months of steady employment (Figure 3). In contrast, 
Jatropha plantations in the Sattur region provided about two weeks of steady employ-
ment, and only once the trees had reached maturity after three to four years (Figure 4). 
As a result of energy dispossession, affected land users have been migrating to urban 
areas in search of wage labor in paper and firework factories. However, the availabil-
ity of low-skilled industrial work has been in decline in recent years beca use of the 
expansion of high-tech Special Economic Zones (SEZs) into the region. Tamil Nadu’s 
Prosopis land users are therefore at risk of becoming what Marxist political-economy 
scholars call a “surplus population.”
These findings are not unique to Sattur. Prosopis is being uprooted in many states to 
make space for Jatropha. The GOI has been actively establishing SEZs on “vacant” 
lands throughout the country, further exacerbating processes of dispossession. In par-
ticular, SEZ projects in the north of India have been linked to widespread protests over 
5 Vandana Shiva, Soil not Oil: Environmental Justice in a Time of Climate Crisis (New York: South End 
Press, 2008). 
6 Jennifer Baka, “Making Space for Energy: Wasteland Development, Enclosures, and Energy Dispossessi-
ons,” Antipode 49, no. 4 (2017): 977–96.
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the loss of land-access rights.
Conclusion
 
This paper illustrated the objectives and social impacts of India’s transition from bio-
mass to biofuel. A problematic conceptualization of wastelands has been central to the 
outcomes of this process. Rather than acknowledging the significance of wastelands 
to livelihoods, the GOI has focused efforts on getting wasteland estimates “right” in 
order to locate rural development schemes. These conceptualizations of wastelands 
have dispossessed rural wasteland users, creating rural energy shortages and job 
losses. Yet, the impacts on agrarian livelihoods have been obscured in policy discus-
sions because of the government’s shifting perceptions of what constitutes “modern” 
energy and “productive” land-use practices.
  
It is likely that future land-use improvement schemes will continue to center on waste-
lands. To avoid repeating the outcomes of the Social Forestry Programme and the 
National Mission on Biodiesel, it is imperative to acknowledge the livelihood signifi-
cance of wastelands in policy debates and to challenge the idea of wasteland users 
as “backward.” When I asked interviewees to define wastelands, I was repeatedly in-
formed that there are no such things as wastelands, since all lands are currently in use. 
Figure 3: 
Landless laborers 
cutting Prosopis in 
rural Tamil Nadu. 
Photo by author.
Figure 4: 
Female laborer 
harvesting Jatropha, 
Tamil Nadu. Photo 
by author.  
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In other words, wastelands are already “improved” because the lands are providing 
important energy services to rural communities. Policymakers would do well to incor-
porate this perception into their energy policy planning.
Further Reading
Gidwani, Vinay Krishin. “‘Waste’ and the Permanent Settlement in Bengal.” Economic Political 
Weekly 27, no. 4 (1992): PE39–PE46. 
Haberl, Helmut. “The Energetic Metabolism of Societies Part I: Accounting Concepts.” Journal of 
Industrial Ecology 5, no. 1 (2001): 11–33. 
Whitehead, Judy. “John Locke and the Governance of India’s Landscape: The Category of Was-
teland in Colonial Revenue and Forest Legislation.” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 50 
(December 2010): 83–93.
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Sarah Strauss and Carrick Eggleston 
Experimenting with Energyscapes: Growing up with Solar and Wind in 
Auroville and Beyond
The path to sustainable energy systems is never singular. Energy transitions are inher-
ently experimental, requiring flexibility and recognition of the limits of site and scale. 
For Auroville in South India, overcoming limitations on the scale of renewable energy 
required moving development off-site and involved local, regional, and even national 
policy shifts. Such transformation includes not only technological novelty, but also 
new ways of thinking about what is possible. Each community, each nation, must take 
stock of its own resources, values, and opportunities to make effective choices for 
foreseeable futures that are, themselves, moving targets. The notion that such energy 
systems, whether at the household level or on a wider scale, would be developed once 
and then left alone is also unrealistic; instead, we must understand that living commu-
nities will grow and change, just as their technologies, resources, and systems must.
“The City the Earth Needs”: Auroville, Sustainability, and the Anthropocene
Auroville, “the city the earth needs,” is an intentional community founded in 1968. 
From a few dozen members at the start, the Auroville community grew to 2,700 mem-
bers in 2017, representing 53 nationalities.1 Auroville’s energyscape (pace Appadurai)2 
transformed along with the landscape. The notion of energyscapes allows us to con-
sider “the problem of energy in motion across social and physical spaces, shifting its 
cultural, social, economic, and technological values as it flows from one domain to the 
next.”3 The energyscape of the Auroville bioregion (encompassing parts of the state 
of Tamil Nadu as well as the Union Territory of Pondicherry) is significant because it 
illuminates critical aspects of energy production and distribution in relation not only to 
scale, but also to siting and context. All energy is not equal, and access to (or impacts 
1 “Census September 2018—Auroville Population,” Auroville: The City of Dawn, last updated 7 September 
2018, http://www.auroville.org/contents/3329.
2 Arjun Appadurai, The Future as Cultural Fact: Essays on the Global Condition (London: Verso, 2013).
3 Sarah Strauss, Stephanie Rupp, and Thomas Love, eds. Cultures of Energy: Power, Practices, Technolo-
gies (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2013), 11.
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from) the same resources can vary widely depending on location and interaction with 
other resources or activities.4
  
In Auroville, new generations of solar and wind technologies emerged as the trees 
grew and began to shade the original installations. This required new towers to be 
built, and connections between shade and sun, heat and light, energy and opportu-
nity had to be reimagined. Auroville today provides an unusual window into a world 
where solar and wind power have been used continuously for 50 years. Along the way, 
Auroville’s residents have developed new technologies and energy policies that affect 
people throughout India. Every phase of solar and wind innovation has been repre-
sented in this small community. These gradual transitions across the realm of renew-
ables highlight not only the intersection of technologies—for example, from battery 
storage to grid-tied solar electric systems—but also a shift from basic subsistence to 
the panoply of consumer luxuries that abundant electrical power allows.
 
Auroville’s experiences in navigating such complex and ever-changing cultural and 
sociotechnical terrain provide both templates and cautionary tales for rural and ur-
ban transformations across India and the world. The negotiation of power in all of its 
senses is an ongoing challenge for Auroville: it is a highly contested space, comprising 
over one hundred enclaves within the community and several villages at the margins. 
The transformation of the Auroville bioregion over the past two hundred years of co-
lonial and postcolonial history is central to the story of Auroville’s emergence, as the 
constraints and opportunities that engaged both the material context and the mean-
ings of this social-ecological system have continued to feed each other. The “capacity 
to aspire”5 for both local villagers and newcomer Aurovilians has been shaped by 
changes in the economic, environmental, and energy landscapes over time, especially 
with regard to forest and water resources. 
4 Robert McC Netting, Smallholders, Householders: Farm Families and the Ecology of Intensive, Sustain-
able Agriculture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
5 Appadurai, The Future as Cultural Fact, 187.
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The Past: Deforestation in South India
In 1750 a local king hunted for elephants and tigers in the nearby forest, in what would 
become known as the Auroville bioregion in the twenty-first century. Forests were later 
cleared to remove the tiger threat. The last two-thousand-year-old neem trees were cut 
down in the 1950s to build boats. Blanchflower notes that at present, the only surviving 
forest is in sacred groves around temples.6 By the 1960s, the Auroville bioregion was a 
desertified plateau with little agriculture and an impoverished population. Reforestation 
was a primary initial goal of Auroville’s founders. The lack of shade in the searingly hot 
climate was a key motivator—not just for comfort, but to protect food plants, soil mois-
ture, and water resources. Both food production and reforestation required immediate 
attention to water management with the specific goal of “net-zero” runoff. Water was 
trapped and allowed to infiltrate the ground to support crops as well as the regional 
water table. “Bunds”—dirt ridges built around fields—were built to prevent rainwater 
runoff and to increase water infiltration and retention. Today, we still see active bunds 
and infiltration ditches to collect runoff and reduce evaporation, maintaining groundwa-
ter at sustainable levels. 
Into this Martianesque landscape (Figure 1a), The Mother7 imagined a central struc-
ture that would be a focal point for the new community, and so began the Herculean 
task of making this part of her dream—what became the Matrimandir—a reality. The 
Matrimandir is an impressive construction by any standard, standing about 30 meters 
above the surrounding plains; in Figure 1b you can see it in the distance from the 
roof of the Auroville Foundation building next to City Hall, itself the site of one of the 
first grid-tied solar arrays in the state of Tamil Nadu. Begun in 1970, the Matrimandir 
was completed in 2008. Well before its completion, the Matrimandir’s electrical needs 
were met by what was at the time India’s largest photovoltaic array, commissioned in 
1997. At the end of the twentieth century, Auroville accounted for about 15 percent 
of all installed photovoltaics in India. Renewable energy has been crucial to water 
6 In Eliza Kent, Sacred Groves and Local Gods: Religion and Environmentalism in South India (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).
7 The Mother is the common name for Sri Aurobindo’s soulmate, a French-Lebanese woman named Mira 
Alfassa, who dreamt of the founding of Auroville in the plains north of Pondicherry, where she and Auro-
bindo lived and taught in the first part of the twentieth century. According to the Mother, Auroville, the 
City of Dawn, would “belong to nobody in particular . . . [but] to humanity as a whole.” (“The Auroville 
Charter: A New Vision of Power and Promise for People Choosing Another Way of Life,” Auroville: The 
City of Dawn, last updated 21 November 2018, http://www.auroville.org/contents/1).
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management and irrigation from Auroville’s early days, in which first wind turbines 
and later photovoltaics were used to pump water out of wells. Today, some wind but 
predominantly photovoltaics remain the backbone of water management in Auroville. 
Photovoltaics power water-well, irrigation, and fountain pumps on the Matrimandir 
grounds just as they do around much of Auroville.8
Auroville’s Energyscape
Solar photovoltaics, very expensive in the 1980s and 1990s, were installed on a house-
by-house basis in small arrays for pump systems and lighting. Auroville’s reforestation 
efforts could not proceed indefinitely without affecting these installations; the dynam-
ics of this social-ecological system continued to evolve. The shifting landscape, with 
its deliberate afforestation, gradually impinged upon renewable energy systems. Trees 
began to block the sun (Figure 2) and likewise the wind, making wind-driven water 
pumping less viable. More recent photovoltaic installations were placed on new build-
ings in Auroville, sitting above much of the forest canopy or in sufficiently large clear-
ings. But the changes have been in fits and starts. While the Matrimandir and larger 
Auroville construction projects have been carefully designed and executed, much of 
8 Sandra Loret, Samuel Martin, and Deoyani Sarkhot, “Sustainable Energy in Auroville: The Vision and the 
Reality,” Report to the Municipality of Auroville (Auroville: Technology and Sustainable Development, 
École Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne, Switzerland, and IIT Madras, India, 2002), http://research.
auroville.org/system/papers/attachments/000/000/627/original/Sustainable_Energy_in_Auroville_Sand-
ra_Loret_Samuel_Martin_Deoyani_Sarkhot_2002.pdf.
Figure 1A: 
Eroded landscape of 
Auroville ca. 1968. 
Photo of original by 
Sarah Strauss.
1B: 
The 30m tall 
Matrimandir as 
viewed from atop the 
three-story Auroville 
Foundation building 
(foreground) that 
supports one of 
the first grid-tied 
photovoltaic arrays 
in Tamil Nadu, 
emphasizing the 
reforestation of the 
barren landscape 
upon which Auroville 
was founded in 1968. 
Photo by Carrick 
Eggleston.
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the rest of the community simply “grew up,” with shifting residences and residents; 
changing environmental conditions created by storms or floods; and an assortment of 
technical problems and misalignments caused by differing timelines for the replace-
ment of system elements (such as solar panels or batteries), or simply by shifting plans 
and priorities.
Individuals and small enclaves make independent decisions about household- to ham-
let-scale options, although they also contribute to decision making at the wider com-
munity level. Experimentation is ongoing. Auroville is a complex entity; it is managed 
by consensus, with a Residents’ Assembly and several working groups, and commit-
tees for day-to-day affairs and longer-term planning. The governance strategy means 
that, in theory, every Aurovilian has the ability to affect all decisions made for the 
group, but in practice only a small number participates in any given action. There are 
also a variety of enterprises that develop and produce new technologies, as well as 
think tanks and other organizations that consult with outside entities on a wide vari-
Figure 2: 
Various photovoltaic 
installations in Auro-
ville, each affected by 
forest shading. Note 
that some installa-
tions are far more 
recent than others 
and that reasons for 
shading are complex. 
In some cases, new 
arrays were installed 
with the acceptance 
of shading to avoid 
loss of forest; in 
others, panels were 
taken down from tall 
mounts to protect 
them from storms, 
and never put back 
up because the storm 
damaged the stand. 
Also, salt corrosion 
has increased the 
incentive to keep 
panels closer to the 
ground where they 
can be worked on 
more easily. Photo by 
authors.
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ety of topics, including renewable energy, organic farming, and reforestation. Such 
enterprises draw on both the prior experiences of Aurovilians and the experiments 
that they have conducted at Auroville itself. Very little at Auroville is obligated, except 
a requirement for individuals who would like to become newcomers or residents to 
adhere to the yoga of Sri Aurobindo and the Dream of the Mother,9 but these are inter-
preted quite broadly within the context of understanding that Auroville is meant to be 
a place “where human relationships, which are normally based almost exclusively on 
competition and strife, would be replaced by relationships of emulation in doing well, 
of collaboration and real brotherhood.”10 Many different ways of being in the world, 
and of problem solving, have thus emerged. One person’s vision of a “solar village” 
might be realized very differently from one enclave to another; down the road, one 
might find an elite community filled with Bollywood screen royalty or, across the field, 
a community living in thatched huts in the traditional local style. There is no single 
Auroville, just a set of ideals inscribed by Aurobindo and The Mother that might sup-
port progress toward human unity as they defined it.
The vision of a self-sufficient 
community supported by re-
newable energy has developed 
over time in Auroville in ways 
that are closely connected to 
both available materials and a 
changing landscape. As an ex-
ample, Figure 3 shows a flow-
chart for a proposed “Solar 
Village” in Auroville. This 1980 
concept of a solar village uses 
solar collectors as a way to heat 
water. The connection of solar 
to electricity is indirect, through the medium of biogas. Indeed, the main form of solar 
energy in this solar village concept is biological photosynthesis—a vegetable garden, 
banana trees, an orchard—to provide both biomass (food and nonfood) and waste for 
9 “Auroville Entry Policy 2017,” Auroville: The City of Dawn, last updated 17 December 2018, https://auro-
ville.org/contents/4450.
10 “A Dream: Envisioning an Ideal Society,” Auroville: The City of Dawn, last updated 5 November 2018, 
https://auroville.org/contents/197.
Figure 3: 
A food and energy 
flowchart for a pro-
posed solar village in 
Auroville, 1980. Note 
that the technology 
considered viable in 
the South Indian con-
text at the time was 
the use of biomass 
to create biofuels to 
run a generator for 
electricity. Photo by 
Sarah Strauss, with 
permission from 
Auroville Archive.
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a biogas plant that would supply fuel to run a generator and produce electricity. These 
systems were seen not just as sustainable, but sustainable in rural South India given the 
limits of village life, rather than an expensive renewable technology beyond the reach of 
the majority of the population. Context matters.
Power Intermittency and Energy Storage
Issues of energy storage have come to the forefront of global energy development as in-
termittent wind and solar energy sources reach a global scale and affect entire electrical 
grids. But Auroville’s relationship with electricity was defined by intermittency long before 
photovoltaics were installed in relatively large quantities. Grid power was not available 
for much of each day, giving the advantage to photovoltaics in the minds of many Aurovil-
ians. Grid intermittency led to relatively large local investments in infrastructure and to the 
widespread development of alternatives regionally, not just in Auroville. The community’s 
municipal planners (“L’Avenir d’Auroville”) pursued long-term solutions to grid intermit-
tency that took advantage of new technologies at a different scale. Locally, many people 
purchased diesel generators to meet their needs when the grid power was off. However, 
generators and diesel fuel are expensive, and within Auroville their noise and exhaust 
were unwelcome.11 Generators also do not start instantly, and power outages meant cost-
ly and unacceptable interruptions, especially with computers running and commercial 
transactions being conducted. Many locations around Auroville, including households, 
guesthouses and municipal offices, and businesses within Auroville therefore invested in 
battery-inverter systems to store energy from the grid to be used during power cuts. 
Some consumers realized that, with existing investments in batteries and inverters, 
photovoltaics would be a relatively modest added expense. These small-scale solu-
tions, implemented locally in the twentieth century, have analogs today at the global 
and grid scale. Massive wind and solar installations worldwide are being coupled to 
fossil-fuel-driven and nuclear-driven power systems not originally designed for inter-
mittency. The problem of power intermittency in South India is not purely the result 
of greater demand for electricity than can be supplied. Intermittency is connected to 
policy. Choices must be made about who will lose power most frequently. Grid power 
11 Loret, Martin, and Sarkhot, “Sustainable Energy in Auroville.”
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is provided for free to farmers to extract water from wells and irrigate fields, but the 
farmers are the first to lose power since priority for continuous power is given to the 
university and large industrial users. Auroville was previously not classified as a major 
power user and so experienced frequent power interruptions. By actively using more 
grid power, Auroville could achieve a new status that allowed for more reliable access. 
In a municipal power report,12 it was also suggested that Auroville could invest in 
grid-scale wind turbines elsewhere in India, feed power to the grid, and be eligible for 
better terms from the power company. In late 2014, the Varuna project became reality: 
several grid-scale wind turbines (4.3 megawatts capacity), built elsewhere by Auro-
ville, supplied power to the Tamil Nadu grid. Auroville then achieved a different status 
as a power consumer. Fewer power interruptions, improved reliability, and decreased 
prices all affected Auroville’s power use; electricity was now perceived to be “free.”
 
The expense and difficulty of renewable energy in Auroville initially limited power 
usage. One cannot just install solar panels, but must also face an array of “balance of 
system” costs and complexities including a racking system for the panels, batteries, 
battery maintenance, charge controllers, inverters, wiring—often with the help of a 
paid installer or technician and often without a reliable supply chain for specific prod-
ucts. However, removal of the expense was sufficient to permit some quick changes. 
On our return to Auroville in 2015, we found that our former guesthouse now had a 
toaster, microwave oven, electric water kettle, and an electric espresso machine, none 
of which were possible in 2013 when we first arrived there. In addition, new air con-
ditioners and water heaters had changed the level of comfort available in the rooms 
and the ability to manage it. There was also a new entertainment system, and a small 
electric car. The incentive to avoid excessive electricity use was removed.
 
While overall energy use by the guesthouse increased, the uptick is smaller than one might 
at first assume. The electric water kettle and espresso machine for guests supplanted an 
earlier system in which two large urns, one with coffee and one with tea, were supplied to 
guests each morning. The propane required to heat the water for these urns on a stovetop 
used more primary energy than electric water-heating systems do. Electrification for tea 
and coffee is therefore more energy efficient. The new air-conditioning and water-heater 
systems for guest rooms do increase overall energy usage, but this increase is modest 
12 “Auroville Municipal Energy Plan,” Auroville: A Universal City in the Making, last modified 23 May 2012, 
https://www.auroville.info/ACUR/documents/municipal_energy_plan.pdf.
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and the source is now renewable, rather than fossil-fuel, energy. One unanticipated result 
of the change to wind-powered, grid-tied electricity in Auroville was that there was no 
longer an incentive to install photovoltaics (Figure 4). The city was now being powered by 
renewable energy to a greater extent than ever before, but where previously the renew-
able energy infrastructure was highly varied (solar cooking, solar hot water, mechanical 
wind-driven water pumps, biogas, photovoltaics) and local (small individual installations), 
now it is mostly externalized.
Hopeful Signs: Implications for the Future of Renewable Energy
In many ways, Auroville pointed the way toward renewable energy in India and provided 
real-world experiential knowledge that supported implementation on a wider scale. Au-
roville goes somewhat beyond the typical “niche” described by Geels13 and others, for 
13 Frank Geels, “The Multilevel Perspective on Sustainability Transitions: Responses to Seven Criticisms,” 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1, no. 1 (June 2011): 24–40.
Figure 4: 
Flow diagram 
showing parallel in-
dividual (short-term) 
and municipal (long-
term) responses to 
power intermittency. 
Individual solutions 
supported a local 
renewable power 
industry (symbolized 
by the “+” in lower 
right), but the munic-
ipal approach—while 
providing renewable 
power—resulted 
in lost support for 
the local renewable 
power industry 
(symbolized by the 
“-” at lower right). 
Diagram by Carrick 
Eggleston.
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two reasons. Firstly, there are multiple simultaneous, but independent, efforts to move to-
wards a sustainable energy system, from the household level to private enterprise and the 
wider community. This is not just a singular R&D site. Secondly, because of the privileged 
space Auroville occupies within the Indian government (at national and state levels), its 
consultants have disproportionate influence in designing policies and suggesting prac-
tices. Auroville therefore affects both regime and landscape levels. One example of this is 
the development of grid-tied net-metering systems for rooftop solar in the state of Tamil 
Nadu. Auroville was the initial test/demonstration site for this initiative, using a system 
designed there between 2012 and 2013. Later that year, the first statewide policy was 
issued, with specific implementation instructions following the Auroville model.14 In Auro-
ville, and in India more generally, the shift to grid-scale renewable energy has increased 
overall energy use. This can be viewed as a limitation on the ability of renewable energy 
development to displace carbon emissions from (for example) coal-fired power plants. 
While renewable energy is rarely implemented for reasons of climate change mitigation, 
the result is in fact often mitigation of climate change drivers, but this is not always the 
case. Each new system transformation must be evaluated in context, and no “silver bul-
lets” for carbon reduction can be assumed. 
What Does It Mean to Be Modern? Evolution of Energy and Consciousness in 
Auroville
This experiment in community has created the tools to allow Aurovilians to dwell in 
a degraded landscape, highlighting how renewable energy and water systems can be 
integrated to provide an alternative to the fossil fuels that enabled notions of “Progress” 
in the production of “Modernization” as embodied in development projects. “Energy” is 
no more a modernizing force than is iron or water or fire or air; all can be put to techno-
logical uses that increase efficiencies and mask the costs, economic or environmental, 
of such resource use. Fossil fuels, in their limited time as the dominant source of energy 
as the West rose in power, have certainly created a shortcut, a way of moving and act-
ing that seems to speed up and extend our capacities as humans, per Marx, to act upon 
14 Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd (TANGEDCO), “Memo.  
No.CE/Comml/EE/R&C/AEE1/F.Solar NM/D. 023/14, dt.17.02.2014,” 17 February 2014,  
http://www.teda.in/pdf/TANGEDCO_dt_17_02_14.pdf.
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nature and society. But in conversations about this,15 reasonable questions emerge as to 
the symbolic and metaphorical values that fossil fuels have for modernity as a way of en-
gaging the world. The changing energyscape of Auroville has coevolved with its diverse 
range of community members, who have not only converted a “ruined”16 landscape back 
into one that supports life in all its forms, but created a built environment that offers 
different ways to imagine community, prosperity, and sustainability. The Aurovilians 
responded to their unique conditions, and continue to act on the land and its resources 
as experimentalists—agents who are not just consumers or citizens, but also producers 
of the energyscape as it plays out on many scales that change over time.
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16 Anna Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
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Daniel A. Barber 
Climate-Sensitive Architecture as a Blueprint: Habits, Shades, and the 
Irresistible Staircase
Patterns of Desire
The relationship of climate to the built environment has been of increasing interest 
over the past decade. As is generally known, the production and operation of buildings 
contributes between 40 percent and 60 percent of the carbon emissions produced by 
the industrialized world. For this reason, buildings have become a site for the making 
of efficient energy systems—or at least of attempts to do so—through innovations in 
everything from thin solar panels to design that maximizes nonmechanical heating 
or cooling potentials. Architecture, as a profession, a cultural realm, and a discursive 
space, is entangled with ambitions for energy transitions. Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine, not to mention enact, a low-carbon future without a substantive transformation in 
the ways that buildings are designed, built, and inhabited. 
If architecture is, in this sense, a locus for contemporary energy debates, it is so in 
a fashion that demonstrates the complexity of these discussions, even their seeming 
intractability. This is true in terms not only of technology, policy, and regulation rela-
tive to carbon emissions, but also of the cultural dynamics through which architecture 
is developed and refined. In other words, across this nexus of architecture, climate, 
and energy, two important considerations emerge. To what extent can innovation pro-
duce apparent solutions? And is it possible for design to encourage different kinds of 
cultural aspirations and to build, or possibly renovate, the conditions that would al-
low low-energy ways of living to proliferate? Recent historical scholarship and design 
research, by Nerea Calvillo, Jiat-Hwee Chang, Lydia Kallipolitti, Kiel Moe, and many 
others,1 have intensified this discussion.  
1 Jiat-Hwee Chang, A Genealogy of Tropical Architecture: Colonial Networks, Nature, and Technosci-
ence (New York: Routledge, 2016); Lydia Kallipolitti, History of Ecological Design, Oxford Research 
Encyclopedias Online, April 2018, http://environmentalscience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acre-
fore/9780199389414.001.0001/acrefore-9780199389414-e-144; Kiel Moe, Insulating Modernism: Isolated 
and Non-isolated Thermodynamics in Architecture (Basel: Birkhauser, 2014).
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Furthermore, numerous critics outside the field have illuminated the intensity with 
which buildings—as cultural and technological objects—have come to be seen as 
both obstacles and opportunities in a collective ambition to reconsider ways of life 
amidst climatic instability. Amitav Ghosh, in his landmark text The Great Derange-
ment: Climate Change and the Unthinkable,2 is interested in clarifying the extent to 
which the climate challenge is rooted in culture as much as technology. He identifies 
the importance of buildings early on, in two seminal passages: “Culture generates 
desires,” Ghosh writes, “for vehicles and appliances, for certain kinds of gardens and 
dwellings—that are among the principal drivers of the carbon economy.” A seem-
ingly simple causal imperative, locating design intention as essential to broad social 
transformations. Focusing even more closely on the cultural dimensions of design and 
its reception, Ghosh continues, “[I]f contemporary trends in architecture, even in this 
period of accelerating carbon emissions, favor shiny, glass-and-metal-plated towers, 
do we not have to ask, What are the patterns of desire that are fed by these gestures?”3 
At stake, for Ghosh, is how new buildings, new narratives, and new cultural practices 
can adjust such patterns and foster new desires.
Perhaps even more significant than the embodied energy of the glass and metal plates 
Ghosh refers to are the thermal conditions such façades produce: the shiny towers of 
late capitalism are, in general, fully sealed systems, reliant on mechanical condition-
ing. These buildings reflect how cultural desire, enacted in a range of social and geo-
graphic contexts, has produced interior spaces with a consistent temperature and hu-
midity, all generated through fossil-fueled air-conditioning and heating systems. In the 
brief excursus below, I want to outline a historical moment when such desires, and the 
technologies that facilitated them, were still in development, and when other ideas and 
processes regarding everyday life inside buildings were still seen as viable and avail-
able—that is, before a diffuse yet seemingly definitive shift towards mechanical condi-
tioning took over. I will focus on a series of experiments in 1940s Brazil that sought to 
condition interiors by architectural, rather than mechanical, means, and will outline the 
kind of politics involved. What emerges is a nuanced historical relationship to a past 
that is also resonant across a possible future, as cultural desires are, slowly, opening 
towards other frameworks for inhabiting the built environment, and the planet, on differ-
2 Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016).
3 Ghosh, The Great Derangement, 9–10, 11.
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ent carbon terms. What emerges as well is an emphasis on the potential for habits—the 
rote manifestation of patterns of desire—to enact (albeit slowly and through a logic of 
accumulation) different lifestyles and different consequences for planetary futures.
Evidence
I want to play this out through a few buildings, to focus on a moment when new kinds of 
individual and collective habits were seen to be central to the modernization process—al-
most as an energy system itself. Or, put differently, I am focused on the articulation of an 
architecture that operated in concert with repetitive gestures as a sort of geophysiological 
conditioning—the production of a relationship between bodies, buildings, thermal inte-
riors, and climatic instabilities. Such patterns and habits can be framed as a supplement 
to existing energy conditions, as a politically driven and architecturally activated means 
to draw the population into modernity. Habit, following Wendy Hui Kyong Chun,4 is here 
posed as a means of analyzing historical change. It offers a different set of causal relation-
ships, whereby the aggregation of small gestures is seen as a counter-practice to the ac-
cumulation of carbon: an epochal change built on patterns of desire.
The architecturally induced habits I am interested in are well captured in the Ministry of 
Education and Health (Ministério da Educação e Sáúde—MES) in Rio de Janeiro. The 
building was designed by Lúcio Costa and a team of Brazilian architects and built between 
1936 and 1943. It is a tall, narrow structure with a more amorphous form—an audito-
4 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, “On Hypo-Real Models or Global Climate Change: A Challenge for the Humani-
ties,” Critical Inquiry 41, no. 3 (Spring 2015): 675–703.
Figure 1: 
Lúcio Costa, Oscar 
Niemeyer, Carlos 
Leão, Affonso Edu-
ardo Reidy, Ernani 
Vasconcelos, et 
al., Ministerio da 
Educação e da 
Saúde (MES), Rio de 
Janeiro, 1936–1943. 
Source: Victor and 
Aladar Olgyay, Solar 
Control and Shading 
Devices (New York: 
Reinhold, 1957).
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rium—intersecting at the base. This established a template for an early phase of modern 
towers, more or less repeated in the UN Headquarters in New York and in many US em-
bassies around the world, among other buildings built in this same period. Predating, by a 
decade or so, the proliferation of the shiny glass and metal towers that Ghosh refers to, the 
Ministry building deploys a second skin to cover the glass-curtain wall and to modulate 
the effects of the sun on the interior. The north, sun-facing exposure thus protects the in-
terior from overheating through banks of operable louvers nested in an egg-crate façade; 
the south façade is all glass. The shading devices hold the façade together as a visual field, 
while the variation in each module is both formally dynamic and effective as a device to 
engage with the microclimate. As the diagram at the bottom of Figure 1 indicates, the 
inhabitants could adjust the conditions of the interior according to the path of the sun and 
their desired interior temperature. 
The shaded façade was, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the primary site for cre-
ative architectural production in the period.5 In this specific case, and as part of a cycle 
of global architectural development, it was deeply enmeshed in the Estado Novo: the 
modernizing, authoritarian-democratic regime of Getúlio Vargas. The building was es-
sential to, and is emblematic of, the social and economic processes of modernization as 
they came to play out in Brazil. The ministry itself (that is, the government agency, not 
the building) was focused on improving the education and health of the Brazilian popu-
lation, deep into the hinterland. The maintenance of the body and the mind were seen 
as essential to a complex governmental project of transforming the population, relative 
to a global political economy of globalization, neoliberalization, and the collective opti-
mization of resources. This reflected, in fact quite closely, Michel Foucault’s well-known 
triumvirate of security, territory, and population in his discussion of new governmental 
regimes, and also clarified the terms by which the public was newly imagined as subject 
to management and optimization.
A few other examples help to clarify how climate, design, and governance were en-
tangled. The Rio-based firm MMM Roberto (run by brothers Mauricio, Milton, and 
Marcelo) rose to some prominence in this period through their expertise in careful-
ly shaded buildings for modernizing programs. A number of government commis-
sions—a press agency, airport facilities, technical training institutes—established the 
5 Daniel A. Barber, Climatic Effects: Architecture, Media, and the Great Acceleration (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, forthcoming 2020).
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brothers’ reputation relative to both 
shading mechanisms and political 
priorities. Of especial interest is their 
design and construction of the head-
quarters of the Brazilian Reinsur-
ance Institute (IRB), also completed 
in 1942. It is compelling both for its 
façade and for the significance of the 
activities that went on inside: the IRB 
housed a government fund intended 
to assure foreign capital that invest-
ments in Brazil would be safe. The 
Roberto brothers’ later factory, ware-
house, and offices for the Caterpillar 
corporation offer a general indication 
of how modern architecture became 
essential to Brazil’s economic and so-
cial development.
The Roberto brothers were prolific along these lines, creating climate-sensitive build-
ings that reflected the complexity of these socioeconomic transitions. One such ex-
ample is the Edificio Seguradoras, a speculative office building for the property insur-
ance industry built in 1949; on its sun-facing façade, there were at least four different 
means of adjusting the conditions of the interior according to the seasonal and diurnal 
patterns of solar radiation. A weekend retreat for workers at the IRB, commissioned 
by the Vargas administration, provides an elegant contrasting example in the formal 
organization of the building—it had a fixed, integrated shading screen rather than 
one allowing multiple forms of manipulation. The example of the IRB retreat also sup-
ports my assembly of these buildings around evident biopolitical notions of self-care: 
a reinsurance agency that seeks preemptively, it seems, to support the health and 
happiness of its employees, and a means of using architecture (and the design of the 
façade in particular) to reflect cultural desire and enact it towards a more open physi-
ological future. At the Marques do Herval, a speculative office building in Rio’s center, 
the brothers were given license to further explore how the inhabitants could control 
their interior conditions through dynamic interaction with the façade, both through 
Figure 2: 
MMM Roberto, 
Associação Brasileira 
de Imprensa (ABI), 
Rio de Janeiro, 
1936. Source: The 
Architectural Forum, 
August 1944.
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an attuned engagement with the climatic membrane and as an active physiological 
integration between the body and the conditioning of the interior; ultimately, between 
habit and climate.
A final example: The Edificio Mamae was built by the Roberto brothers in 1945, one of 
the first modern buildings in Copacabana, as an apartment building that could house 
their entire extended family. Each of the brothers had at least one floor, and their 
mother, by then widowed, occupied the seventh story, which was protected by a ter-
Figure 3: 
(top) MMM Roberto, 
Edifício Seguradoras, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1949; 
(bottom left) MMM 
Roberto, Colonia de 
Ferias do Instituto de 
Resseguros do Brasil 
(IRB), 1947; (bottom 
right) MMM Roberto, 
Marques do Herval, 
Rio de Janeiro, 1952. 
Source: Victor and 
Aladar Olgyay, Solar 
Control and Shading 
Devices (New York: 
Reinhold, 1957).
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tiary shading screen. The dynamism of the Edifi cio Mamae façade was such that it 
demanded elaborate attention from the inhabitant, with a number of adjustable and 
fi xed elements, as seen in the section drawing in Figure 4. The emphasis is on the fa-
çade system as a designed membrane that draws the inhabitant into engagement with 
climatic patterns. The inhabitants—the family—attended to its needs through these in-
teractions. Though, signifi cantly, in the case of the Roberto family interaction with the 
façade was likely to have been performed by domestic servants rather than the family 
members themselves: a substantive complication of the political economy of habit that 
I cannot fully address here, but which nonetheless begins to indicate a yawning gap 
between the diagrammed possibilities of interactive, climate-sensitive design and the 
lived experience of these interiors.
Habit
Awash in these contingencies, these buildings are best seen as events in the history 
of a future yet to come: liminal moments of engaging bodies directly in regimes of 
modernization that seem less like a past, which has since been overcome by the forces 
of progress and economic growth, and more like a future, a scenario for a new ap-
proach to cultural and climatic contingencies. That is to say, as the built environment 
Figure 4:
MMM Roberto, 
Edifício Mamae, 
Rio de Janeiro, 
1945. Source: The 
Architectural Review, 
November 1947.
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has since been overwhelmed by mechanical air conditioning, and as the environment 
more generally has absorbed the carbon emissions that have resulted from such me-
chanical proliferation, the way that we think about buildings and about how to inhabit 
them is undergoing stark transformation. Although, perhaps, not stark enough.
The space of the thermal interior, in both domestic and commercial environments, is 
thus enacted and emphasized in order to reimagine an embodied relationship to cli-
mate—a politics of the everyday. The question becomes: Can we induce habits—in 
ourselves, our friends and colleagues, our children and grandchildren—that activate 
a different relationship to fossil fuels? If so, the goal of such architecture, and related 
scholarship, is to provide a framework in which such patterns of desire can be enacted 
and emphasized. As Chun puts it, “Habit occurs when understanding becomes so strong 
that it is no longer reflected, when an action is so free that it anticipates and escapes will 
or consciousness, or when a being’s repeated actions assuage its own needs.”6 Habit 
occurs, in other words, at least in some instances, when it becomes architectural.
Can a building make us act differently? Can it induce new habits? Stated differently: Is 
the “normalized” thermal condition of the built interior imposed or desired? Much re-
cent work in architectural engineering has focused on adaptive comfort as a means to 
encourage regional and cultural specificity in the experience of the interior. One built 
example, more direct perhaps, concerns a staircase. The Bullitt Center, an office build-
ing in Seattle designed by the Miller Hull Partnership, has been both excoriated for its 
awkward solar roof and celebrated as an example of the “Living Building Challenge”: 
a set of imperatives for design and construction focused on a principle of carbon nega-
tivity; that is, on using buildings to produce renewable energy rather than burn fossil 
fuels. One way the designers sought to reduce the building’s energy load was through 
the specification of what they called an “irresistible staircase,” a lush wooden arrange-
ment placed “right at the front entrance.” The elevators are tucked in behind, available 
to those who need them but harder to access. “This stairway has near-magical pow-
ers: people can’t seem to resist going up.” Per the building’s website, “the irresistible 
stair helps the Bullitt Center conserve energy and encourages the tenants to maintain 
a healthy lifestyle.”7 Thus, an imperative to make climate-sensitive habits irresistible.
6 Chun, “On Hypo-real Models,” 702.
7 Bullitt Center website, http://www.bullittcenter.org/building/building-features/active-design/. On the 
Living Building Challenge, see Living Future website, https://living-future.org/. Both accessed 12 January 
2018.
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It is, no doubt, too simple a political program to imagine that new and exhilarating 
architectural interventions can transform the carbon economy. It is also too simple to 
rely on individual predilections to aggregate towards a global sociopolitical shift that 
embraces carbon negativity. Yet, the conditioned interior and the staircase become 
sociopolitical objects available for manipulation on these terms. They are cultural ob-
jects that not only propose to generate new desires, but that also open up new spaces 
of contestation, available for elaboration as a different kind of lived environment in 
the future.
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